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DEBATE
INTRODUCTION
In 1890, Louis Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy.1
Within a matter of years, the courts began adopting his theory,
creating a newly articulated legal right. This article likely represented the high-water mark of legal academia in terms of real
world impact. In recent years, the academy has lost much of
its relevance. Chief Justice Roberts ridiculed academic work,
suggesting that legal scholarship has become esoteric and
irrelevant.2
This should not be the case. The quality of legal scholars is
higher than it has ever been—young scholars now often enter
the academy with doctoral degrees in related fields. Likewise,
technology has placed a world of information at our fingertips.
Scholars can write pieces that react to quickly changing events
at an unprecedented speed.
Yet the speed of publication in flagship print editions has
lagged behind the speech of scholarship itself. By the time a
piece of writing is published, almost a year has passed since it
was submitted. And if the piece elicits a response, it would
come out a year after that. At this point, two years have gone by
since submission and in the fast paced world of legal scholarship, a final riposte will often not be relevant. The end result is,
that aside from the occasional citation, most scholarly debates
are obsolete or irrelevant by the time they appear in print. This
should be unacceptable given that our profession is, at its core,
adversarial.
Adversity can help make legal scholarship more relevant.
Although a legal practitioner can easily research the case law,
she cannot as easily identify the points of interpretive conflict.
Now more than ever, it is essential for academic works to present the competing views of a theory in a package that identifies where the real points of reasonable disagreement lie. Yet
1

Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
See Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts, Jr., Interview at
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Annual Conference (June 25, 2011), http://www
.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts at approx.
30:40 (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely
to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in
18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the
academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.”).
2
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this is a difficult task for any single scholar. All minds are
subject to bias, even more so when the subject has already
stoked scholarly passions. And even in the cases where a
scholar can fairly present disagreements, there is simply no
way for a practitioner to identify an exceptional piece from the
volumes of scholarship without significant expertise in the
field.
Unfortunately, this means that despite the skill and best
intentions of legal scholars, the solution to this problem is
largely out of their hands. Further, the students that comprise
the editorial boards of America’s legal journals do not have the
knowledge to consistently ensure that an article includes
voices of reasonable opposition.
This “debate” is an attempt to remedy the problem. Instead
of imposing our opinions on the academy, the editors of the
Cornell Law Review have decided to facilitate what is essentially a public peer review process of an article published in a
previous volume of our journal.
In Volume 101, we published an article by Professors
Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe entitled Is the Constitution Special?3 This article argued that, contrary to common
belief, it is difficult to justify lawyers’ distinct interpretive approach to the Constitution, as opposed to statutory or common
law. This was a novel and controversial claim that begged to be
subjected to heightened scrutiny. After an extensive selection
process, the senior editorial board invited Professors Richard
Primus and Kevin Stack to act as critics of the Serkin and
Tebbe piece, and they graciously accepted.
Over the course of the past year, these four scholars have
engaged in a written exchange debating Serkin and Tebbe’s
argument. It begins with Primus and Stack’s critiques of the
article and then carries on for a total of six critiques and responses (two from each critic and two from the authors). While
the result of this experiment will be determined by its readership, we believe that it has been a success. As will be seen in
the pages that follow, the initial theory has been clarified and
elevated while the facets of disagreement have been cleaved for
both future scholars and practitioners.

3

NELL

Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORL. REV. 701 (2016).
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THE COST OF THE TEXT
Richard Primus†
Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe’s Is the Constitution
Special?4 explores many facets of constitutional interpretation.
I will focus here on their observation that constitutional interpretation is “less textual” than statutory interpretation. I place
the expression “less textual” in quotation marks because “textual” could mean many things, such that it would often be
problematic to characterize one interpretive exercise as more or
less textual than another. In Serkin and Tebbe’s view, as I
understand it, mainstream constitutional interpretation is
“less textual” than statutory decisionmaking in that it is less
constrained by the words of particular enacted clauses.5 As a
convenient shorthand, I will refer to the phenomenon that
Serkin and Tebbe observe—that lawyers and judges are more
prone to hew closely to the language of particular clauses in
statutory cases than in constitutional ones—as the “textualism
gap.”
I suspect that Serkin and Tebbe are right to think that the
textualism gap exists. And a rich literature offers reasons why
legal practitioners should treat statutory and constitutional
† Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan
Law School. Thanks to Nicholas Bagley, Will Baude, and Mitchell Berman for
suggestions about this paper and to Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe, and Kevin
Stack for their roles in this conversation.
4
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
5
To adapt a term from John Hart Ely, we might say that the kind of textualism that is at issue here is the “clause-bound” kind. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11–42 (1980) (describing and
criticizing “clause-bound interpretivism” in constitutional law).

R
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text differently.6 For present purposes, however, I am less interested in whether interpreters should treat statutory language differently from constitutional language than I am in
explaining observed patterns in how practitioners actually do
treat the two kinds of text. If practitioners do treat the two
kinds of text differently in the ways that prescriptive theories
advocate, it is possible that the persuasive power of the theories explains, or helps to explain, the observed differences. But
it is also possible that the observed differences in practice are
largely independent of what judges and professors say ought to
be done. Indeed, the textualism gap might not reflect—or
might not merely reflect—any conscious choices among practitioners to treat the different kinds of text differently. Perhaps
the reasons for decisionmaking that does not hew closely to the
words of enacted clauses are roughly the same in the statutory
and constitutional contexts, but, for a combination of reasons,
the circumstances in which those reasons apply are more common in constitutional cases than in statutory ones.
Consider three reasons why judges decide cases on bases
other than the wording of particular enacted texts.7 (1) Sometimes there is no enacted text directing a determinate answer to
the question that must be decided. (2) Sometimes prior courts
have decided cases that bear on the question at issue, such
that courts decide by reference to precedent rather than by
reference to an enacted text. (3) Sometimes the decision to
which enacted language points is simply unacceptable, such
that judges feel it would be irresponsible to follow the words of
a text meekly down the road to perdition.
Serkin and Tebbe have the first reason firmly in view.8 The
Constitution contains many broadly worded standards, and
cases calling for the application of those standards require
something beyond textual reasoning. I suspect, however, that
the textualism gap is mostly a product of the other two reasons—the role of precedent and the costs of adhering to the
wording of enacted texts.

6
See, e.g., Kevin Stack, The Inference from Authority to Interpretive Method in
Constitutional and Statutory Domains, supra (responding to Serkin & Tebbe, supra
note 4).
7
By setting out these three reasons, I do not mean to suggest that decisionmaking by direct reference to enacted text is the normal or the default mode of
judicial decisionmaking in the American system.
8
See, e.g., Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 4, at 751 (identifying several broadly
worded constitutional clauses that might give rise to nontextual interpretation in
constitutional law).

R
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Consider the role of precedent first. Most constitutional
litigation occurs in a small number of doctrinal categories,
each of which is piled high with case law. As a result, judges
rarely have occasion to recur to the underlying text. Statutory
litigation also has many domains with richly developed case
law, and in those domains, it is similarly true that decisionmaking proceeds on the basis of case law more than by reference to enacted text. But because the U.S. Code is sprawling
and prolix, and because its text changes much more frequently
than the text of the Constitution does, statutory litigation features orders of magnitude more opportunities for decisionmaking in areas of first impression. As a result, more statutory
cases are decided by reference to the text directly.
Next, and perhaps most interestingly, consider the costs of
adhering strictly to the wording of enacted texts. Constitutional law, I suggest, is more prone than statutory law to furnish occasions on which following a text woodenly would yield
an unacceptable result in a high-stakes case. It does so not
because the Constitution is especially poorly drafted but because Americans in each generation have a way of making their
most salient issues into issues of constitutional law, whether or
not prior generations would have recognized them as such.
That means that constitutional law regularly presents highly
salient issues that the text of the Constitution was not written
to address. There is a persistent mismatch between the text of
the document and the set of concerns that well-socialized
American lawyers expect the Constitution to vindicate. Constitutional interpretation responds to that mismatch by deciding
cases nontextually—by which I mean, in this paper, deciding
cases in ways other than by reading enacted language to mean
something that might occur to a competent reader of English
who did not share the substantive expectations of American
constitutional lawyers.9
I
OF NONTEXTUAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Courts sometimes depart from the words of enacted
clauses in statutory cases, not just in constitutional ones.
Serkin and Tebbe give the example of the Sherman Act, under
which courts have elaborated doctrine that particularizes a
general standard but without being guided by specific statutory
9
See Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91
(2010) (describing the role of the expectations of constitutional lawyers in shaping
the accepted readings of the Constitution’s text).
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language.10 In other words, decisionmaking under the Sherman Act does not proceed on the basis of close readings of
enacted text, and the reason why might be (most commentators just say that it is) the first of the reasons for “nontextual”
decisionmaking given above: the text is not specific enough to
resolve the issues presented.
In a different vein, consider the status of workplace affirmative action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
wording of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) does not contain vague language about equality that courts have particularized in a way
that permits affirmative action. On its face, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) seems to prohibit affirmative action, because it clearly and
flatly prohibits employers from distinguishing among employees or applicants on the basis of race or sex.11 Nonetheless,
courts construe Title VII to permit affirmative action on the
basis of race and sex when certain conditions are met.12 Note
that courts do not pretend that the specific words of Title VII
permit affirmative action under those conditions as an exception to its otherwise general rules prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race and sex. Nor do courts claim that the wording
of Title VII is indeterminate on the point. They simply proceed
under established doctrine that treats affirmative action as
permissible under Title VII when the given conditions are met,
irrespective of what the words of the statute say.13
In other cases, courts wrestle with the meaning of words in
statutes, and even read the words closely, but then decide that
the words mean something that might surprise competent
readers of English. Consider King v. Burwell.14 The Supreme
Court in that case asked whether the phrase “an Exchange
established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”15 refers only to exchanges es10

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 4, at 752.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“Employer practices. It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
12
See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (sex); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (race).
13
See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (initiating this
approach).
14
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
15
Id. at 2487 (emphasis omitted); 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c) (2012).
11

R
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tablished by state governments or also to certain exchanges
established by the federal government. The Court in King devoted considerable effort to a close reading of the statute, taking fourteen paragraphs to find the relevant language
“ambiguous” as between the two possibilities16 and then explaining at similar length why the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of reading “an Exchange established by the State” to
include exchanges established by the federal government.17
In my view, King was rightly decided, and obviously so.
But the Court’s characterization of the phrase “an Exchange
established by the State” as “ambiguous” requires critical scrutiny. Ordinarily, to say that a phrase is ambiguous is to say
that it admits of two different meanings. As applied here, the
suggestion would be that the words “the State” in section 1311
could mean either “the state” or “the state or the federal government.” But the expression “the State” does not normally admit
of that second meaning.18 Moreover, the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) defines the term “State” to mean “[(a)] each of the 50
states [of the United States,] and [(b)] the District of Columbia.”19 Whatever problems the wording of section 1311 might
have raised, a lack of semantic clarity rooted in multiple possible meanings of the term “State” was not among them.
The decision in King makes sense not because a competent
reader of English who came across section 1311 standing alone
might wonder whether “the State” meant “the state” or “the
state or the federal government” but because the overall statute
of which section 1311 is a part—the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act—would make no sense if the phrase “an
Exchange established by the State” were given its plain meaning. Common sense therefore required implementing the statute as if section 1311 contained different words from the words
Congress actually enacted. But the Court was not confronting
statutory language whose meaning was relevantly indeterminate and choosing one of the plausible meanings of that language. It was confronting words that had a clear meaning and
rejecting that meaning—correctly, in my view—in order to prevent those words from defeating the purpose of the statute

16

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–92.
Id. at 2492–95.
18
To be sure, there is a generic sense of “state” in which the word just means
something like “government.” But that is not the normal meaning of “state,”
much less “State,” in American law.
19
See 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012) (defining “State”).
17
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overall.20 In other words, the Court rejected the plain meaning
of a textual clause in favor of other, more important considerations, but when it did so it purported to be interpreting the
language rather than disregarding it.21
The point of the foregoing examples is not to deny the textualism gap. I agree with the conventional wisdom on which
statutory decisionmaking today is, on the whole, more governed by the wording of specific enacted clauses than constitutional decisionmaking is. But the fact that various areas of
statutory law depart from the wording of enacted clauses as
20
This understanding supports the Court’s choice not to afford the Internal
Revenue Service Chevron deference in its construction of the language at issue in
King. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (refusing, on a rationale different from the
one explained here, to afford Chevron deference). Chevron deference applies when
statutory language could reasonably be given legal force in more than one way. In
King, the plain meaning of section 1311 pointed to a certain way of giving legal
force to the statute, and the overall plan of the statute pointed to another. But the
fact that the plain meaning of section 1311 and the overall plan of the statute
pointed in two different directions does not mean that there were two reasonable
interpretations of the law. Given the statute overall, giving legal force to the plain
meaning of section 1311 would have been unreasonable. Put differently, the
interpretation of the ACA proffered by the King challengers was not one reasonable interpretation out of some larger set of plausible reasonable decisions. It was
just wrong, despite the fact that it would have given the statute a meaning that
accorded with the plain meaning of section 1311’s language.
One could also shed light on this point by asking about the locus of the
alleged “ambiguity” in King. What, precisely, was ambiguous? The answer cannot
be section 1311 standing alone. Standing alone, the words of section 1311 unambiguously point to the meaning for which the challengers contended. The Court’s
reasoning might accordingly be taken to mean that section 1311 was ambiguous
in context—that when the ACA is considered as a whole, the meaning of section
1311 becomes less clear. But it is not correct, I suggest, to think that there was
any relevant ambiguity at the level of the statute as a whole. Considered as a
whole, the ACA clearly points to the result sought by the government.
The fact that the statute as a whole clearly requires departing from the plain
wording of section 1311 does not make that wording “ambiguous.” It means that
section 1311 must be given a meaning different from the meaning it would plainly
have standing on its own. In particular, section 1311 must be read to refer to
exchanges established by the federal government as well as to exchanges established by states. To state baldly what should be obvious, language that must be
given one particular meaning is not “ambiguous,” regardless of whether the one
meaning the language must be given is its literal meaning or some other meaning.
And where there is no ambiguity—no multiplicity of reasonable ways in which
legal language could be given force—there is no role for Chevron deference.
21
As noted in the first paragraph of this Response, “textualism” names a
family of interpretive approaches rather than a single rule or set of rules. There is
of course a sense in which such a decision like King, which is based on the overall
plan or purpose of a statute, is not less “textual” than a decision that hews closely
to particular language in the statute, because both the meaning of the particular
words and the sense of a statute overall can reasonably be described as considerations about the text. But as was also noted, see supra note 2 and accompanying
text, it is the role of close reading, or of “clause-bound” textualism, that is of
interest in the present analysis.
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much as any area of constitutional law suggests that the formal
division between statutory and constitutional cases is not
enough to explain the textualism gap.
II
THREE FACTORS
I suspect that more substantive considerations do the work
of determining when courts hew closely to enacted clauses and
when they are more willing to reason in other ways. Above, I
noted three relevant factors: the determinacy of enacted
clauses, the presence of precedent, and the potential cost of
hewing closely to the wording of enacted language. Consider
each now in a bit more depth.
(1) Indeterminacy. Serkin and Tebbe note the difference
between enacted language that articulates precise rules and
enacted language that articulates less determinate standards.22 Not all texts are equally directive, and a court confronting a less-directive text is more likely to reason in ways
that go beyond the words in front of it, if only because it is
impossible to decide the case without doing so. But that difference between rule-like and standard-like texts is only the
beginning.
(2) Precedent. Another factor is the difference between legal questions with thick accumulations of case law on point
and legal questions where the case law is thinner. The first
case to construe a constitutional clause, like the first case to
construe a statutory provision, is more likely to reason closely
about the text than the hundredth case decided under the
same language, because the hundredth case has ninety-nine
precedents shaping its approach. If those precedents are sufficient to dispose of the issue, then the court is unlikely to reason closely about the underlying enacted language at all. It
doesn’t need to. Indeed, it might go wrong by doing so, because
part of a court’s responsibility is to decide consistently with
precedent. And even if the precedents don’t fully dispose of the
issue, the question that the court must decide might be one to
which no close reading of the underlying text would speak,
either because governing doctrine had already traveled a fair
distance from enacted text, or, if the doctrine was fairly understood as working within possible meanings of enacted text,
because the question presented for decision might concern
22

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 4, at 719.

R
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something that had never been adequately specified by that
text.
(3) Cost. Some cases have a great deal at stake, whether
practically or symbolically or both. Others matter less. Where
relatively little is at stake, courts are more likely to be content
to go where a text (or any other preexisting authority) points
them, regardless of whether that destination seems sensible to
them on the merits. But the more that a case matters—or
perhaps more precisely, the more that the decisionmakers
think that a particular outcome in the case would be awful23—
the more those decisionmakers are likely to resist authorities
that seem to direct undesirable outcomes. It is one thing to
lose a dollar because of a poorly worded clause, and it is quite
another to lose a kingdom because of one. Reasonable people
expend more effort in fighting the latter prospect than they do
in fighting the former one. So the tendency to reject a text and
the tendency to work hard to find a way to re-read that text
both increase as the perceived cost of obeying the conventional
reading of the text increases.
III
ASSESSING THE FACTORS
The literature on constitutional interpretation canonically
points to the first factor—the indeterminacy of the relevant
texts—as a reason why constitutional interpreters frequently
reason nontextually.24 There is something to that observation.
I suspect, however, that the second variable—the existence of
relevant precedent—explains more of the textualism gap be23
This refinement is meant to operate along two dimensions. First, the importance of a case for these purposes is measured subjectively, from the decisionmakers’ point of view, rather than objectively. What matters for predicting
whether decisionmakers will be content to follow a text meekly, even when it
seems to point in a bad direction, is the decisionmakers’ sense of the stakes rather
than anything about what the stakes “really” are. See infra pp. 109–10. Second,
by saying that the willingness to depart from textual authority rises with the
decisionmakers’ sense that a particular outcome would be awful, rather than just
the sense that a lot is at stake, I mean to point out that decisionmakers often
know that a legal question is important but do not have a confident sense of which
outcome would be harmful. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The
Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 694 (2011)
(suggesting that decisionmakers are often unable to predict whether constitutional decisionmaking procedures will yield outcomes they favor or outcomes they
oppose). A decisionmaker in that situation might be delighted to have a rule to
follow mechanically, because it relieves him of the responsibility for the decision.
24
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that several constitutional
clauses cannot be given determinate legal content unless the interpreter looks
beyond the words of the clause).

R
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tween statutory and constitutional interpretation than the first
factor does.
Consider equal protection cases. In most cases that we say
“arise under the Equal Protection Clause,” courts do not reason
about the meaning of the words “equal protection,” struggle
with the indeterminacy of that phrase, and then reason
nontextually to decide which possible meaning of those words
is most appropriate.25 They simply consult case law, deciding
the issues before them without ever grappling with the possible
meanings of the words “equal protection.” So it is true that the
words “equal protection” do not carry a single, determinate
meaning. But the indeterminacy of the clause’s meaning is not
what prompts courts to engage in the kind of nontextual reasoning in which they do in fact engage. What drives courts to
reason as they do is a thick body of case law.
One might be tempted to think that the existence of that
thick body of case law is itself a product of the indeterminacy of
the underlying text. If that were so, then the indeterminate
meaning of the words “equal protection” would still be driving
the nontextual decisionmaking we see in equal protection
cases, just at one remove. Textual indeterminacy would drive
the development of case law as a means of settling questions
that could not be resolved on the basis of the text alone, and
the fact that judges made decisions based on that case law
rather than directly on the basis of the text would then be
traceable to that text’s indeterminate meaning.
Perhaps such a dynamic does account for a share of constitutional interpretation’s tendency to operate less textually than
statutory interpretation. But we should not overestimate that
share. After all, broadly worded and standard-like constitutional clauses are not the only ones that become the subjects of
thickly developed case law. Consider the Eleventh Amendment.26 No first-semester law student identifies the Eleventh
25
In the Supreme Court’s recent landmark decision in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), the opinion of the Court used the words
“equal protection” four times: once when stating the question presented, id. at
2204, once when stating the holding of a lower court, id., once when stating the
petitioner’s claim, id. at 2207, and once when stating the meaning of one of its
own precedential cases, id. at 2210. At no point did the Court engage questions
about the range of meanings that the phrase “equal protection” might bear, nor
did it at any point frame its analysis as answering questions about how to particularize the meaning of those words.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
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Amendment as a text that speaks in broad and indeterminate
principles. It reads like the statement of a relatively specific
rule.27 But that has not prevented the development of a thick
body of case law. When judges decide Eleventh Amendment
cases, they do so on the basis of that case law rather than by
reading the text closely, and their reason for doing so is not
that the text is broad and indeterminate.
What drives interpreters to develop thick case law, and to
decide cases nontextually, in contexts like Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, where the text is not especially broad? A
big part of the answer, I suspect, is about the third factor I
identified above: the perceived cost of hewing closely to the text.
For many constitutional interpreters, state sovereign immunity
and the related issues of federalism are enormously important.
These interpreters are strongly committed to the idea that the
constitutional system requires a certain set of answers to the
relevant questions. The text of the Eleventh Amendment, on its
face, would not vindicate the answers to which these interpreters are sincerely and powerfully committed. And their commitment is strong enough to prompt them to depart from the
enacted language, even though the language is specific rather
than general.28
I suspect that this third reason for nontextual decisionmaking—the stakes of a case, and the unacceptably high cost
of the result that simple forms of textualism would direct—has
been underappreciated in the recent literature on legal interpretation. Indeed, I suspect that this third factor is sometimes
the most powerful force in prompting nontextual decisionmaking. And it operates in statutory cases as well as constitutional
ones.
Consider King v. Burwell again. Each of the first two factors discussed above would seem to make King a case in which
courts would hew closely to the language of the clause at issue.
First, the relevant wording—“an Exchange established by the
State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Afforda27
See generally John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading
of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1665–67 (2004) (characterizing the Eleventh Amendment as “precise”). To be sure, one can argue about
whether a text is specific or general. But if the wording of the Eleventh Amendment is nonspecific, then so is most if not all of the wording of the U.S. Code, and
that would mean that we could not point to the generality of the Constitution’s
wording as a factor that distinguished statutory from constitutional
interpretation.
28
That is exactly what Manning cogently argues ought not to happen. Id. at
1665. And yet it does.
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ble Care Act”—did not force judges to reason nontextually by
virtue of being broad or general. The clause states a rule, not a
standard, and the rule is stated with a fair degree of specificity.
Second, the issue was a matter of first impression. No prior
Supreme Court decisions had construed the meaning of the
language at issue. So the Court’s choice to depart from the
plain meaning of section 1311 in favor of considerations of
statutory purpose and common sense was not driven by either
of the first two factors. It was driven instead, I think, by the
third factor: the enormous cost of taking the plain meaning of
section 1311 as authoritative. Giving the words “established
by the State” their ordinary meaning would have made hash of
a major statute and wrecked a gargantuan government program. That consideration was strong enough to overcome
whatever tendency the first two factors might have had to foster
a ruling based on the plain meaning of the words “established
by the State.”29
Something similar is true with respect to affirmative action
under Title VII, or at least with respect to the initial cases
departing from statutory language in that domain. The reason
why courts permit affirmative action in workplaces covered by
Title VII is not that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 contains broad or
open-ended language on the point. The wording of section
2000e-2 would pretty clearly prohibit employers from practicing affirmative action if it were given its plain meaning. And
courts have not pretended that the language itself is indeterminate. They have simply overcome the language, ruling that
29
It is worth noting that in the particular case of King, the enormous potential consequences of the case were the motivation for the plaintiffs’ making the
close-reading argument in the first place, as well as the major reason for refusing
to accept that argument. The case in King arose as a deliberate attempt to wreck
the ACA; the architects of the challenge scoured the statute’s language for weaknesses that could be used to bring down the system, and they found 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B(b)–(c). Absent the motivation to destroy the ACA, it is likely that nobody
would have given the language “an Exchange established by the State” its plain
meaning simply because nobody would have thought about it. As a matter of the
common sense of the regulatory plan, 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c) was obviously supposed to apply to exchanges established by the federal government as well as
those established by states, and everyone would have operated the statutory
scheme that way without a second thought if nobody had gone looking for
problems. But once the linguistic glitch was spotted and made salient, a court
would need to overcome the plain meaning of the language in order to deny the
plaintiffs’ claim. In a case with less at stake, the Supreme Court might well have
gone along with the challenge, saying something like, “Look, we know that reading
‘State’ to mean ‘State’ might make a mess of how Congress intended its system to
work, but hey, this is what they legislated, and it’s not our job to clean up after
them.” But that argument goes down easier when the mess is small. See discussion of Lamie v. United States Trustee infra p. 116.
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affirmative action is sometimes permissible even though the
words of section 2000e-2 do not seem to permit it.30 Today, of
course, the reason why courts permit affirmative action despite
the wording of section 2000e-2 is that case law directs them to.
But when the first cases establishing this line of precedent
were decided, it mattered that the permissibility vel non of affirmative action was highly important, both as a practical matter and as a symbolic one. The Supreme Court that decided
United Steelworkers v. Weber31 in 1979 was not going to let
affirmative action in the workplace disappear just because the
language of section 2000e-2, read strictly, would prohibit it—
not as long as the Court could say, and, I am confident, believe,
that the overall purpose of Title VII was consistent with some
affirmative action, whether or not affirmative action was consistent with the letter of the statute.32
Now consider the constitutional domain. As noted earlier,
most cases here are decided by reference to judicial precedent,
not by reference to enacted constitutional text. Many bodies of
constitutional doctrine are, at least officially, engaged in giving
meaning to textual standards that are too indeterminate to
dispose of particular cases, such that courts must engage in
nontextual reasoning in order to apply the text at all. Think of
free speech cases, or takings cases, or cases about cruel and
unusual punishments. But as also noted earlier, constitutional decisionmaking frequently proceeds under precedent
even when the associated text is specific, and in some contexts
the doctrines developed to “apply” those texts cannot reasonably be described as particularizing those texts further. Instead,
the doctrines direct decisionmaking that competent speakers
of English who did not know the stakes of the cases would
30
See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding a private affirmative action plan aimed at addressing the past practices that had
blocked African Americans from holding certain positions).
31
Id.
32
The resemblance between Weber and King is obvious, with the distinction
that in King the Court labored to declare the statutory language “ambiguous,”
rather than forthrightly acknowledging its choice to do something at variance with
the wording of an enacted clause. That difference is likely the product of a
changed legal culture. In 2015, judges were much less willing than they were in
1979 to admit, and perhaps even to recognize, that they are doing something
other than abiding by an available meaning of particular enacted language. The
desire to maintain the pretense that one is not subordinating a statute’s wording
to other considerations is what drives the Court in King to its nonstandard deployment of the word “ambiguous.” In current practice, perhaps a clause is “ambiguous” if either (a) its language admits of two different meanings, or (b) the one
meaning of which its language admits is so unfortunate that courts will refuse to
give that meaning legal force. (Call this the ambiguity of ambiguity).
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simply never imagine could be plausible interpretations of the
constitutional language. Above, I gave the example of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine. Other examples include cases applying
the First Amendment against the federal executive branch33
and cases reading the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limit
on Congress’s delegated powers rather than an instruction applicable in cases where Congress has no delegated power to act
upon.34 In these cases, the courts are not choosing among
possible plain meanings of the relevant words in constitutional
clauses. The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”35 There is no
theory of plain meaning on which “Congress” might mean “The
President.” None, anyway, that preserves what a theory of
plain meaning is supposed to deliver, because a theory on
which “Congress” might mean “The President” is a theory on
which language could mean a lot of surprising things, and that
is exactly what plain-meaning jurisprudence is supposed to
prevent.
So the reason why courts do not hew closely to the wording
of enacted texts in these contexts is not that the textual language is imprecise. It is that following the specifications of the
language would yield unacceptable results in fields of law too
important to be sacrificed to the abstract idea that plain language ought to govern. Courts are unwilling, and properly so,
to permit Presidents to censor speech, because doing so would
betray a deeply held American value and probably enable the
President to become a dangerously threatening figure. Current
doctrine reads the Tenth Amendment as affirmatively pushing
back against the enumerated powers of Congress on the theory
that the essence of American federalism requires such a doctrine, whether the wording of the Constitution captures it or
not. In short, mainstream interpretive practice is for courts to
depart from enacted language when they really need to—that
is, when they see a lot to lose from a mechanical application of
the idea that enacted language, read plainly, states the law.
33
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (applying the
First Amendment against the federal executive despite its being addressed to
“Congress”).
34
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (“[U]nder the
Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but
this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself[.]”). For
further development of this point about the Tenth Amendment, see Richard
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 629–30 (2014).
35
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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A caveat is here in order. The point is not that the areas of
law—be they constitutional or statutory—in which courts set
aside the plain meaning of enacted texts have systematically
higher stakes than those in which courts stay within the limits
of enacted phrases. Much of the time, enacted language successfully describes what a court should do in order to prevent
things from going badly wrong. As a result, courts (and other
officials) can usually keep the government operating smoothly
without departing from the directions given in relevant statutes
and constitutional clauses. It is not necessary to depart from
plain meanings in order to authorize the federal government to
maintain the armed forces,36 or to prohibit states from holding
whites-only elections,37 or to prevent Congress from declaring
its members officeholders for life.38 The situation where courts
must set plain meanings aside in order to prevent seriously
adverse consequences arises only when something has gone
wrong, either because the text was badly written or because
something important—maybe a material circumstance, maybe
the prevailing set of normative values—has changed since the
text was written.
So with respect to each kind of enacted text, two questions
arise. First, how often does something go wrong in one of these
ways? Second, when something does go wrong in one of these
ways, what are the costs of hewing closely to enacted language?
One of the reasons why constitutional law lends itself to
“less textual” decisionmaking than statutory law, I suspect, is
that a larger proportion of the cases falling within the constitutional domain have high stakes, whether practically or symbolically. So even if the Constitution and the U.S. Code were
drafted with equal degrees of skill and equal degrees of specificity, and even if both texts were revised to keep up with a changing world at the same rate (which of course they are not),
constitutional litigation would probably involve a higher percentage of cases in which courts would be put to the choice
between abiding by the words of enacted clauses and sanctioning terrible results. Assuming that judges are no less inclined
to avoid terrible results in constitutional litigation than in other
kinds of litigation, we should expect judges to depart from enacted language more often in the constitutional context.

36

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 13–14.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
38
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (House of Representatives); U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII (Senate).
37
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In suggesting that constitutional law involves a higher proportion of high-stakes cases than statutory law does, I am not
claiming that constitutional law is more important overall than
statutory law, nor that in each year the number of high-stakes
constitutional cases exceeds the number of high-stakes statutory cases, nor that the most important cases are always constitutional. I am not claiming that all constitutional cases are
high-stakes cases, nor even that most of them are. It is obviously true that modern America is pervasively structured by
statutory law, and a reasonable case could be made for the
proposition that the U.S. Code today is, as a practical matter,
more important, both in the functioning of American government and in the lives of individual Americans, than the Constitution is.39
But the U.S. Code, being orders of magnitude more extensive and prolix than the Constitution, also gives rise to a great
many low-stakes cases. A “low-stakes case,” in the sense in
which I intend the term, is one in which the decisionmakers do
not feel deeply invested in the outcome, except in the general
sense in which they always think it important to get decisions
right. To be sure, many of the cases I am calling “low-stakes”
are important to someone. The parties to particular cases often
have a great deal at stake, even if nothing about the case is
unusually salient from the perspective of the decisionmaker.
To criminal defendant Smith facing the possibility of prison,
United States v. Smith is a high-stakes case, and it is a highstakes case regardless of whether it turns legally on a statutory
question (like the meaning of an element in a federal criminal
law) or a constitutional one (like whether evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment). But most judges
regard criminal prosecutions as routine, meaning not that they
see the cases as unimportant, but that their importance is of
an ordinary sort within the judges’ professional lives. Similarly, statutory cases in civil litigation might decide matters of
considerable personal and economic importance to a great
many people without being especially salient to the judiciary.
Consider Lamie v. United States Trustee,40 which Serkin and
39
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 27 (2010). My only hesitation in agreeing to that
proposition outright is that I find it hard to think about either regime in hermetic
isolation from the other. But that means only that the idea that statutory law is
more important should not be taken too woodenly, not that it lacks an important
message about how modern American government really works.
40
540 U.S. 526 (2004).
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Tebbe discuss as an example of statutory textualism.41 It
seems plausible that a ruling about the availability of attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy cases would have important effects on
many people, including those who practice bankruptcy law as
well as those who are bankrupt or who are the creditors of
bankrupt estates. Congress bothered to pass the relevant statute, after all. But from the perspective of a federal court, the
question in Lamie might just be one of many going to the intricate and opaque mass of regulation that the law provides for a
complex society. Before the briefs in Lamie landed on their
desks, Article III judges might have had no view on the issue at
all, and they might not worry much about the issue once the
decision is handed down. The decisions I am calling “highstakes,” in contrast, are the ones whose outcomes are particularly salient to the judges, either because of their expected
consequences or their symbolic value or both.
So maybe the textualism gap between constitutional and
statutory interpretation is mostly explained by two facts. First,
statutory litigation presents more matters of first impression
than constitutional litigation does. After all, the U.S. Code is a
great deal more extensive than the U.S. Constitution. It contains orders of magnitude more clauses to be litigated, and new
ones are produced at a much faster rate than new constitutional clauses are. Given this difference in the number of topics that are litigated, judicial precedent—the chief displacer of
enacted textual authority—does its displacing work less frequently in statutory cases than in constitutional ones. Second,
constitutional litigation might be more likely than statutory
litigation to put judges to the choice between nontextual decisionmaking and unacceptable results. Not because the Constitution is especially poorly drafted, and not because bad
decisionmaking in statutory cases is a low-cost affair from society’s point of view, but because most of the statutory issues
that courts confront as matters of first impression are not issues in which the judges are deeply invested on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Serkin and Tebbe’s titular question is whether the Constitution is special. With specific reference to the textualism gap,
I think the answer is partly no and partly yes. By proposing
that departures from the wording of enacted clauses are driven
by the same factors in the statutory and constitutional con41

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 4, at 716.
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texts, I am pushing back against the claim that prevailing practice treats constitutional text differently just because it is the
text of the Constitution. More particularly, I do not think that
the largest cause of the textualism gap—the relatively larger
share of precedential decisionmaking in constitutional law—
reflects a way in which the Constitution is “special,” at least not
in the sense that interests Serkin and Tebbe. It reflects, as
noted above, the fact that the Constitution is much shorter
than the U.S. Code, or more precisely the fact that there are far
fewer substantive issues that get litigated under the Constitution, which means that a larger share of all constitutional litigation arises in areas with prior case law.
But the tendency of constitutional law to present a higher
share of cases where judges feel there is something important
to lose does reflect a way in which the Constitution is special.
It does so for a reason that I have the space here to gesture at
but not to argue for at length. In brief: constitutional law does
not skew toward highly salient cases because the text of the
Constitution happens, by design or accident or both, to address the most salient issues in American law. It skews toward
highly salient cases because American lawyers find ways, consciously and unconsciously, to make the issues that are most
salient to them into constitutional issues. The Constitution
always embodies the deepest values and highest aspirations of
the American people—not because the words of the document
name a set of values and aspirations that were most salient to
the document’s authors and which have remained constant
over time, but because constitutional interpretation is a practice in which Americans invest the document, in its particular
phrases and in general, with meanings that are relevant to
their own values and aspirations.42 That is special. As long as
American constitutional practice exhibits that dynamic, constitutional cases will contain a relatively high share of the cases
where judges see the most to lose from bad decisions—and the
most to be gained from avoiding too mechanical a reliance on
the language of enacted text.
THE INFERENCE FROM AUTHORITY TO INTERPRETIVE METHOD IN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DOMAINS
Kevin M. Stack†
42

See infra Richard Primus, The Constitutional Constant.
† Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful to Chris Serkin for
helpful comments.
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Should courts interpret the Constitution as they interpret
statutes? This question has been answered in a wide variety of
ways. On the one hand, many scholars and jurists understand
constitutional and statutory interpretation as largely overlapping, continuous, or converging. For some, this overlap follows
directly from the Constitution’s status as a form of legislated
law.43 In this way of thinking, because the Constitution, like a
statute, was bargained over and formally adopted, it should be
interpreted in accordance with general principles applicable to
legislated law.44 Proponents of this view argue that if constitutional interpretation appears distinctive in practice, that is because it involves the application “of usual principles” to “an
unusual text,” not because special principles apply.45 For
others, the commonality between constitutional and statutory
interpretation follows from more general commitments about
the character of law. The premise, for instance, that the fundamental imperative for courts is to make decisions—whether
constitutional, statutory, or common law—that align with contemporary values renders constitutional, statutory, and common law methodology continuous.46
On the other hand, many embrace interpretive and methodological pluralism, including divergence between constitu43
Legislated law, including statutory law and written constitutions, is expressly and intentionally made to change the law. See John Gardner, Some Types
of Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY 51 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
44
See, e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION § 92, 80 (1882) (“Our constitutions, being, like statutes,
written instruments and laws, are, in the main, similarly interpreted.” (internal
citations omitted)); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 37–40 (1997) (explaining that a “common-law way of making law” is
“not the way of construing a democratically adopted text,” and noting that statutory rule that “a text does not change would apply a fortiori to a constitution”).
John Manning also argues that the fact that the Constitution, like a statute,
represents a settlement and compromise mitigates against the adoption of constitutional doctrines, such as federalism and separation of powers, which are not
readily tied to particular provisions of the Constitution. See John F. Manning,
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 2003, 2007–10, 2040 (2009); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers As
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1943, 1947 (2011).
45
SCALIA, supra note 44, at 37 (noting that constitutional interpretation “is
distinctive, not because special principles of interpretation apply, but because the
usual principles are being applied to an unusual text”).
46
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (contesting firm distinctions among statutory, common law, and constitutional interpretation; and positing that all should be interpreted dynamically); Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371,
1384 (2010) (arguing that the Legal Process School’s conception of statutory
purpose, incorporating recourse to more fundamental purposes of public law
“effectively renders statutory and constitutional [interpretation] continuous”).
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tional and statutory interpretation. Defenders of interpretive
pluralism, of which I am one of many,47 also come in different
types. For some, pluralism follows from views about the authority of different types of law or their distinctive roles in the
legal system.48 For others, practical considerations of institutional competence, not first principles, justify divergence in
interpretive method.49 In this vein, many go a step further and
argue that interpretive method also depends on the institutional position and capacities of the official doing the interpreting—that is, that the lower court, the Supreme Court, the
President, and the administrative agency do not (or should not)
have identical approaches to interpretation.50
47
See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory
Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2004) (arguing that neither originalism
nor dynamic approaches to interpretation should be the same when applied to the
Constitution and statutes); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 355, 356–65 (2012) (defending an interpretive method for regulatory interpretation based on the distinctive legal character and legal function of regulations); Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies
Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 873–81 (2015) (arguing that agency
statutory interpretation is guided by different norms than judicial statutory interpretation). Many scholars defend a difference in constitutional and statutory (and
common law) modes of interpretation; these issues are directly explicated and
carefully considered in Kent Greenawalt’s books on public law interpretation, as
part of his three-volume exploration of legal interpretation. See KENT GREENAWALT,
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION (2013) (comparing statutory and common law interpretation, including contrast between agency and judicial forms of
statutory interpretation); KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 5
(2015) (“The similarity of statutes and constitutions [as forms of legislated law]
does not entail that whatever represents sound statutory interpretation applies to
interpreting a constitution. Any such equation would be deeply mistaken.”); see
also Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 267, 271 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002) (arguing for difference in constitutional and statutory interpretation); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 212–13 (2006) (arguing
that agencies should draw on a wider array of interpretive tools than courts given
their different capacities).
48
See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 357–59 (2011) (arguing that interpretive approach, for each set of officials, follows from their relative place in society’s
economy of trust); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
501, 501–04 (2005) (observing and offering a defense of difference in agency and
judicial statutory interpretation).
49
See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 885–90 (2003) (exploring how institutional
capacities shape the way certain institutions interpret certain texts).
50
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327–51 (2005) (arguing that strong horizontal
stare decisis in statutory cases should not apply in lower courts); Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 433, 439 (2012) (arguing that different norms apply to lower
courts and the Supreme Court when interpreting statutes); see also Stack,
Purposivism in the Executive Branch, supra note 47, at 873–81 (citing literature on
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Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe’s article, Is the Constitution Special?,51 is a welcome addition to this long-running
debate over the character of our constitutionalism. Their article has two basic elements. First, it carefully and compactly
chronicles differences in the interpretive norms (which they call
arguments) applied by courts when faced with statutory and
constitutional questions. Serkin and Tebbe’s thoughtful account of the dimensions of divergence in current law and practice is likely to inspire many forms of engagement.52 Second,
their article argues that these observed differences are not justified, and more generally, they contend that the case for divergence in constitutional and statutory interpretation has not
been made.
In this essay, I focus on their second claim that divergence
in interpretive approach between the Constitution and statutes
is not—or has not yet been—justified. To defend this claim,
Serkin and Tebbe’s primary strategy is to isolate characteristics of the Constitution and constitutional law, and argue these
characteristics do not, individually or collectively, justify the
distinctive norms of constitutional interpretation that we observe. They consider a wide collection of attributes of the Constitution, including the generality of many of its terms, the fact
that the Constitution includes broad aspirational principles
(e.g. equal protection), the Constitution’s relative entrenchment from express amendment, its legal supremacy, democratic legitimacy, and its merits and symbolic place in
American self-understanding. Acknowledging that this is not a
comprehensive set of characteristics or considerations that
might differentiate the Constitution and statutes, their article
ultimately relies upon a more general skepticism that understandings of the Constitution’s authority “translate directly, or
even particularly well into interpretive strategies.”53 The Constitution’s “[a]uthority,” they argue, “has less to do with argument than many suppose,” and it “underdetermines
arguing that agencies and courts interpret statutes under different norms and
defending the view).
51
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
52
See, for a start, Richard Primus, The Cost of Text, supra (offering an explanation of the observed divergence).
53
Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 768 (endorsing general view skepticism
about the connection between constitutional authority and interpretation in context of evaluating perfectionist arguments for the Constitution’s authority); see
also id. at 773–74 (embracing the same skepticism about argument for the Constitution’s authority as central to American self-understanding and interpretive
method).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN604.txt

2017]

unknown

DEBATE

Seq: 23

29-SEP-17

13:01

1671

interpretation.”54 In the end, Serkin and Tebbe allow that
some argument from the Constitution’s authority might justify
a particular interpretive approach,55 but they do not think the
case has been made.56
Serkin and Tebbe’s article, in company with prior scholarship,57 raises a fundamental question about how much constraint conceptions of constitutional authority impose on
constitutional interpretation. But to reach their further conclusion that the case for divergence in constitutional and statutory interpretation has not been made requires a comparison of
the grounds of authority of the Constitution, on the one hand,
and statutes, on the other. Even if arguments from authority
do not dictate particular interpretive approaches, I argue that
comparing the grounds of the authority of the Constitution and
statutory law still suggests differences in the methods of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
One note of clarification at the outset: I treat Serkin and
Tebbe’s positions only in reference to constitutional and statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court; that excludes interpretive practices by other courts and other officials. This
limitation is important. There are strong arguments that interpretive practice varies among the Supreme and lower courts, in
state courts, as well as among executive officials. Limiting the
evaluation to interpretation in the Supreme Court isolates the
comparison between constitutional and statutory interpretation without confounding factors relating to the institutional
stance of the interpreter.
I
To see how a comparison in the authority of the Constitution and statutes might support an argument for interpretive
divergence, consider the following premises:
1. The Constitution (and constitutional law) and statutes
(and statutory law) have distinct grounds of authority as
well as distinct roles in our legal system.
2. The differences in the grounds of authority and legal roles
of the Constitution (and constitutional law) and statutes
54

Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
56
Id. at 775.
57
See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 640–69 (2008) (grappling with theories of constitutional authority and their connection to interpretive method).
55
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(and statutory law) make a difference to how the Court
should interpret these two forms of law.

By authority, I mean an account of what explains the respect
courts and others accord that form of law, and by role, I mean
an account of the functions the form of law paradigmatically
serves in the legal system. I address the reasons for the parenthetical inclusion of “constitutional law” and “statutory law”
below.58
These premises generalize a principle articulated by Joseph Raz. Raz writes, “[a] principle of constitutional theory that
commands widespread support says that the principles of constitutional interpretation depend in part on the theory of constitutional authority.”59 The generalization is that norms of
interpretation, not only norms of constitutional interpretation,
depend in part on the authority of the type of law at issue.60
Tebbe and Serkin are skeptical about this generalized principle. One way to address that skepticism is to defend the two
premises indented above. Those premises, if valid, justify divergence in interpretive approach to the Constitution and statutes—and might, one would hope, also shed light on the
precise divergence that Serkin and Tebbe observe in current
law.
To defend the first premise requires identifying grounds for
the authority of the Constitution and statutes. Notice that not
all characteristics or features of the Constitution also make
claims to be a ground for the Constitution’s authority. For
instance, the generality of the Constitution’s terms makes the
Constitution unusual, though not unique, but generality does
not itself provide a ground for why we owe the Constitution
respect.61 Likewise, the fact that the Constitution contains aspirational principles neither distinguishes it from statutes,62
nor provides a ground for its authority. Among the characteristics of the Constitution isolated in Serkin and Tebbe’s analysis,
58

See infra Part IV.
Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 157 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998).
60
See Stack, Divergence, supra note 47, at 56 (defending this generalization
of Raz’s principle).
61
Though, as Primus argues, on different grounds, generality does make a
difference to the constraints that text impose on interpretation. See Primus, The
Cost of Text, supra note 52, at 6–7 & n.2; see also Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51,
at 751–53 (rejecting that the Constitution’s often broad and general wording
justifies its interpretive exceptionalism because the Constitution displays prolixity at times and certain statutes also display broad and general wording).
62
See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 752.
59
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the two most promising candidates that could be grounds for
authority fall under the general mantles of (i) democratic legitimacy, and (ii) stability and continuity.63 We view the democratic mandate or claim of democratic endorsement of a law as
a reason to abide by it; and so too, law’s role in creating continuity and stability in society also provides a reason to respect
it.64 Focusing on these two grounds for authority, the question
is whether the Constitution and statutes part company in ways
that make a difference to their interpretation.
II
First consider claims to democratic authority. As Paul
Kahn observes, claims of democratic authority involve claims
to represent a popular body.65 If this is correct, then the democratic authority of the Constitution and statutory law are derivative of their underlying claims of representation.
But the body the Constitution claims to represent cannot
be the same as the body represented by statutory law. Statutory law claims to represent and derive its authority from the
legislative majority, and through it, the popular majority. The
possibility of repeal or amendment of any statute gives existing
as well as recently enacted statutory law a claim to represent
the legislative majority. To be sure, many features of our system complicate and undermine the extent to which enacting
coalitions reflect the popular majority or even the legislative
majority. The current campaign financing regime, redistricting
practices, veto-gates in the legislature (including super-majority thresholds for bill consideration), in addition to competition
for scarce legislative time and resources, etc., make it more
difficult to draw direct lines between enacting coalitions, legislative majorities, and the popular majority.
63
Tebbe and Serkin note that the Constitution is superior to statutes in the
sense of overriding statutes in the case of conflict. The fact that the Constitution
is superior to other laws is part of what defines it as a constitution, see Raz, supra
note 59, at 153, but that feature does not provide a ground for its authority.
Serkin and Tebbe’s interesting arguments about entrenchment I treat as part of
my discussion of stability and continuity values. The perfectionist arguments do
make claims as grounds for the Constitution’s authority. I do not find them the
most convincing grounds for constitutional authority, see Stack, Divergence,
supra note 47, at 27–28, and so I pass over them here in favor of a focus on
democratic legitimacy and stability and continuity.
64
Cf. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 37–39 (2010) (identifying
command theories and common law approaches, rough cognates to my considerations of democracy and stability and continuity, as two traditions for understanding law).
65
PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AMERICA 198 (1997).
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Even allowing that statutory law is imperfectly
majoritarian, it is clear that the Constitution’s claim to represent a popular body cannot be a claim to represent the
legislative majority. A basic element of our constitutional
scheme is that the Constitution may check and invalidate the
majority as expressed in legislation. The Constitution’s democratic authority therefore presupposes that it represents a different democratic body, a different demos, than the legislative
majority.
Who, then, does the Constitution claim to represent?
Some constitutional theorists argue that the Constitution represents the past supermajorities who enacted and ratified its
text, intending to entrench its provisions against change
through normal lawmaking processes. As a ground for democratic authority, these views face familiar objections, of the type
Serkin and Tebbe discuss, that they necessarily privilege the
preferences of prior generations over current majorities (the
dead hand problem).66 In response, other constitutional theorists argue that the body the Constitution represents cannot be
reduced to any moments of historical consent, but rather is an
intergenerational body that defines “our ‘fundamental nature
as a people.’ ”67 From this perspective, the Constitution claims
to represent an abstract body, a body which exists now or
existed in the past “under the rule of a particular political-legal
order.”68 No doubt there is significant work to be done to explain how such a democratic subject makes a claim of authority over us. Perhaps the hope of a democratic basis for the
Constitution’s authority is ultimately wistful. But the basic
point remains that whether one simply views past supermajorities or an inter-temporal subject as the body represented by the
Constitution, statutory law and the Constitution have different
sources of democratic authority because they claim to represent different democratic bodies.
Turning to the second premise, what implications do these
different claims of democratic authority have for statutory and
constitutional interpretation? Adam Samaha, who is a skeptic
about the relationship between constitutional authority and in66
See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 766; see also Samaha, supra note
57, at 616–25 (discussing dead hand arguments).
67
Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
13, 24 (1990) (quoting Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987)); see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 61, 153–54
(2001); see also Stack, Divergence, supra note 47, at 35–42 (discussing views of
the democratic subject of the Constitution).
68
RUBENFELD, supra note 67, at 153.
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terpretation, is not worried about the authority-interpretation
inference in the context of statutory interpretation. Conceptions of the authority of legislation, he writes, “might logically
guide statutory interpretation.”69 I agree; statutory authority
provides some direction to statutory interpretation. Consider a
statute’s democratic character: the statute represents the legislative majority and ultimately the popular majority through
discrete moments of authorization. In an election, the authorization flows from the popular majority to the elected officials,
and then in the moment of statutory enactment, from the
elected officials to the law. The statute’s representative and
democratic character is defined by these moments of authorization. This makes a difference to statutory interpretation: it
justifies interpreting statutes in a way that attends carefully to
the statutory text enacted and to the statute’s stated and public aims. Moreover, the courts’ (and especially the Supreme
Court’s) statutory interpretations remain accountable to the
current legislative majority; if Congress disagrees with the
Court’s interpretation, it can make corrections.70
In contrast, the body the Constitution represents is not
identified with an ongoing federal institution, like the legislature, and judicial interpretations face little practical prospect of
override. The Constitution’s representation of a popular body
thus has a more symbolic character; the Constitution represents its demos whether conceived as past supermajorities or
an intergenerational people less through discrete moments of
authorization, which an existing body can monitor and call
back, than by standing for the people it represents.71 We (the
People) are constituted and symbolized by the Constitution; as
Serkin and Tebbe observe, the Constitution has a uniqueness
as a cultural symbol, in part because our political-legal order is
identified with the existence of our Constitution.72

69

Samaha, supra note 57, at 637.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 331–43 (1991) (documenting the congressional practice of overriding Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions); cf.
Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in
Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 860–66 (2012) (documenting how the
Supreme Court will reinvigorate precedent that Congress has overridden).
71
See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 39–43, 101–03
(1967) (discussing representation as authorization and as symbolic ‘standing for’);
KAHN, REIGN OF LAW, supra note 65, at 199, 218.
72
See Primus, The Cost of Text, supra note 52, at 11 (noting that American
lawyers frame issues of significance in constitutional terms).

R
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Serkin and Tebbe view “[r]emarkably little” as following
from the Constitution’s distinctive status as a symbol.73 But
comparing the symbolic character of the Constitution’s representation of its subject with that of statutory law sets constitutional and statutory interpretation on different paths. In the
constitutional domain, to claim democratic authority, interpretation must itself play a role in identifying and sustaining a
connection with the body that the Constitution claims to represent. It is from this perspective that Robert Post observes,
the authority of the Constitution “does not flow from the antecedent nature of the Constitution, but rather from the particular relationship we have forged with the Constitution” through
interpretation.74 The symbolic character of the democratic
subject the Constitution claims to represent places a burden
on constitutional interpretation of setting forth principles that
the people can view as their own.75 This is not to say that
background values play no role in statutory interpretation;
they do.76 In the statutory case, courts may check the prospective interpretation against background principles. But statutory interpretation does not have the same narrative burden of
articulating principles in a way that makes sense of, and ultimately constitutes, our collective commitments as a people.
From this perspective, important elements of the divergence Serkin and Tebbe observe in how courts treat these
forms of law fall into place. In particular, the greater attention
to text in statutory interpretation makes sense given the directness of the claim of democratic authorization of statutory text.
Further, the elaboration of the Constitution’s requirements
through a body of law that remains at a considerable distance
from the Constitution’s text provides a means of articulating
and updating principles that the people can identify as their
own. In short, representation through authorization privileges
text, whereas symbolic representation privileges persuasion
through judicial narrative. Comparison of the grounds of dem73

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 773.
Post, supra note 67, at 29; see also Paul W. Kahn & Kiel Brennan-Marquez,
Statutes and Democratic Self-Authorship, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115, 144 (2014)
(explaining that “[t]he courts must persuade the people to take the position of
authorship [of the Constitution]; they must present the meaning of the text such
that the people can hold themselves accountable for this text”).
75
See Kahn & Brennan-Marquez, supra note 74, at 144.
76
See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 9 (tent. ed. 1958) (advocating for
background values as a check to statutory interpretation); Kahn & BrennanMartinez, supra note 74, at 140–44 (illustrating the same in contemporary
context).
74
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ocratic authority thus suggests different orientations in constitutional and statutory interpretation.77 Even if we ultimately
conclude that the Constitution’s claim to democratic authority
is fictive, that conclusion still has implications for interpretation. It means that arguments for attending to text have a
democratic grounding in statutory interpretation that they lack
in constitutional interpretation.
III
Let us now consider another ground of authority: the role
of law in creating continuity and stability in the legal order. To
be sure, continuity and stability are not the only virtues of law.
We also prize law that fosters innovation or justice, for instance. But stability and continuity remain fundamental virtues of legal arrangements. Perhaps most important for our
purposes, creating stability and continuity in a legal order is
also a ground for law’s authority. That is, other things equal, a
reason to comply with a form of law is that it creates stability
and continuity.
Statutory law and the Constitution, however, have a different relationship to stability and continuity. Part of the task of a
constitution and constitutionalism is to create a “stable framework for the political and legal institutions of the country,”78
and to “preserve stability and continuity in the legal and political structure.”79 While constitutions are subject to adjustment
from time to time, to have a constitution is to recognize a form
of higher law that is not subject to the same vicissitudes as
ordinary lawmaking forms; constitutions may change, but a
constitution is designed to be relatively enduring. This is not to
deny, as Serkin and Tebbe importantly reveal, that many other
forms of law turn out to be just as enduring;80 nor is it to deny
that there are other forms of lawmaking that intend to constrain future majorities.81 But it still is the case that constitutional law paradigmatically has the legal and political aim of
77
The Constitution might be thought to have a different kind of connection to
democracy, in particular by promoting the democratic process. In Divergence, I
consider process-based conceptions of the Constitution’s authority and argue
that this role too pushes constitutional and statutory interpretation norms in
different directions. See Stack, Divergence, supra note 47, at 29–33.
78
Raz, supra note 59, at 153.
79
Id.
80
Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 753–59 (considering whether the Constitution’s interpretive exceptionalism can be rooted in its entrenching quality).
81
See generally Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sacks, Political Entrenchment
and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 402–08 (2015) (examining how politicians
employ functional entrenchment mechanisms in addition to the formal modes of
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constraining future majorities and thus creating stability and
continuity to a greater extent than statutory law.
This different connection of constitutional law and statutory law to the values of stability and continuity also has implications for their elaboration. While the Constitution’s role in
creating continuity does not specify a single interpretive
method for the Constitution,82 it makes a virtue of interpretive
approaches that constrain the pace of change from current
norms.83 Interpreting the Constitution to serve stability and
continuity recommends modes of elaboration of the Constitution’s requirements that give substantial weight to the status
quo and require special justification for departures from it, and
even then, favor incremental and developmental changes. Fostering stability and continuity thus provides a strong endorsement of our common law style constitutional elaboration: our
common law constitutionalism gives a legal presumption in
favor of status quo norms and requires special justification for
an interpretation that results in a changed reading of what the
Constitution requires. From this perspective, it makes sense
that we identify our “constitutional law” with the judiciary’s
precedential elaborations of the Constitution’s requirements;
doing so is a way of promoting stability and continuity in our
constitutionalism.
Statutory law, in contrast, does not labor under the same
preservationist norms. When deciding whether to enact a new
statute, Congress faces no formal legal presumption in favor of
the existing law; so long as Congress acts constitutionally, it
need not provide special justification to change the law, much
less opt for more incremental as opposed to cross-cutting solutions. So too, no requirement of special justification applies to
courts when they enforce new statutory requirements; their job
is to implement the statute, even if it involves making significant changes in the law. In this way, the criteria for valid
change in statutory law and constitutional law differ. With
regard to statutory law, Congress may enact a new statute or
statutory amendment that dramatically changes the existing
law, and courts routinely enforce those changes without requiring special justification. With regard to constitutional law,
outside of the rarity of constitutional amendment, the court’s
criteria for recognizing and enforcing changed readings of the
entrenchment through rules governing elections and the processes for enacting
and repealing legislation).
82
Samaha, supra note 57, at 666.
83
Id.
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Constitution creates a presumption in favor of the status quo,
and requires special justification for change. In sum, constitutional and statutory law labor under different criteria for valid
change: a preservationist norm that requires special justification for change applies to constitutional law but not to statutory law. In this way, stability and continuity ground different
norms of change for constitutional and statutory law.
It might be objected that this analysis relies on a false
comparison; it compares change in “constitutional law” as articulated by the courts to change in “statutory law,” including
when Congress enacts a new statute or amends an old one. I
think this comparison is defensible. First, consider Serkin and
Tebbe’s usage. They do not distinguish between constitutional
interpretation, constitutional implementation, the Constitution, and constitutional law. For instance, Serkin and Tebbe
argue that “the meaning of constitutional provisions is constantly changing” outside of Article V formal constitutional
amendments.84 In other words, they treat changes in the judicial doctrines of constitutional law as changes in the Constitution. Thus the norms or arguments they refer to as
“constitutional argument” pertain to the specification or implementation of constitutional law, including, norms of precedent
which clearly do not pertain to “interpretation” in a narrower
sense. This inclusive, non-formalist stance towards the set of
norms that come within the dialogue of constitutional interpretation is widely shared,85 and reflects the view that constitutional law changes primarily through judicial decisions.
I have no objection to this broad view of what comes within
the domain of “constitutional interpretation and argument,”
but that same non-formalist stance should also apply when
considering what counts as statutory interpretation and argument. If constitutional interpretation and argument includes
norms that apply to constitutional development and lawmaking, then so too statutory interpretation and argument should
include norms that apply to statutory development and lawmaking. Taking this functional stance with regard to both constitutional and statutory law reveals that a preservationist
constraint has greater hold on our constitutional than statutory law for the simple reason that change in constitutional law

84

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 51, at 757.
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 5 (2013) (noting that
constitutional interpretation often amounts to constitutional rulemaking and declining to make a strict distinction between interpretation and implementation).
85
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is constrained by precedent whereas change in statutory law is
not.
Serkin and Tebbe might still object that they observe
courts applying a less stringent form of precedent with regard
to constitutional decisions than statutory ones, so doesn’t that
suggest a greater preservationist norm with regard to statutory
law? This difference in the strength of precedent does not reveal that constitutional law is less preservationist than statutory law. In all but the rarest occasions, the only way
constitutional law changes is through reversals of judicial precedent. Not so for statutory law. Congress regularly amends
statutes in ways that change prior statutory text and also overrules prior judicial constructions. So the black letter doctrine
that statutory precedent is stronger than constitutional precedent does not negate the underlying point that a greater
preservationist norm applies to constitutional law and
elaboration.
To summarize, the difference in the roles of constitutional
and statutory law in creating stability and continuity justifies
divergence in their modes of elaboration. Constitutional law’s
role justifies granting weight to current norms and requiring
special justification for change; that same preservationist norm
does not apply to statutory development. Put another way, a
legal presumption in favor of the status quo is intrinsic to constitutional elaboration, but not to statutory law. Accordingly,
the challenge of accommodating change while preserving continuity and stability makes a distinctive demand on constitutional elaboration.
IV
Serkin and Tebbe ask Is the Constitution Special? My response is that to understand the Constitution’s distinctiveness
requires comparing the grounds for the authority of statutory
and constitutional law. Constitutional and statutory law have
different claims to democratic authority and different connections to the values of stability and continuity. Even if these
particular grounds of authority do not constrain interpretive
choice for statutes or the Constitution to a single method, the
contrast suggests different orientations and guideposts in constitutional and statutory interpretation. The contrast also suggests justification for some of the divergence which Serkin and
Tebbe observe in current practice, including the greater role of
statutory text, the greater reliance on judicial decisions as the
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means of elaboration of the Constitution, and the different role
for precedent.
Suggesting that the interpretation of these two forms of law
depends in part on their different sources of authority does not
deny that at times it will be very difficult to distinguish constitutional and statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation
may be hard to distinguish from constitutional interpretation
when, for instance, a court is construing a very old statute,
written in general or aspirational terms, with a significant body
of stable precedent elaborating it.86 More generally, to suggest
that some aspects of the authority of constitutional and statutory law diverge is not to deny that these two forms of legislated
law may have some overlapping grounds of authority which
might, in a given case, be more important than their differences. The basic point remains that the distinct authority and
roles of constitutional and statutory law provides a foundation
for divergence in their interpretation.

MYTHMAKING IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: A RESPONSE TO
PRIMUS AND STACK
Christopher Serkin† & Nelson Tebbe††
In our recent article, Is the Constitution Special?,87 we
demonstrated that lawyers and judges apply special interpretive approaches to the Constitution that they do not apply to
other sources of law, whether statutes or the common law.88
We then asked whether any familiar characteristics of the Constitution justify such interpretive exceptionalism.89 After ruling out the most obvious candidates, we suggested that there
may be a mismatch between the Constitution’s characteristics
and the shape of constitutional argument.
Richard Primus and Kevin Stack have now written two
thoughtful and provocative responses, to which we have been
86
See Primus, The Cost of Text, supra note 52, at 2 (arguing that when a
domain is rich with case law the decision making typically will proceed on the
basis of that case law, whether the matter concerns a statute or the Constitution).
† Associate Dean for Research and Academic Affairs and Professor Law,
Vanderbilt Law School.
†† Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
87
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
88
See id. at 708–49.
89
See id. at 749–75.
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invited to reply.90 The two responses take on different aspects
of our argument. Primus disagrees with our positive claim that
the Constitution is actually subject to different—or, in our
terms, special—methods of interpretation, and he sets out to
show that the differences we identify can be attributed to variations in the context in which constitutional issues arise, and
not to distinct interpretive methodologies.91 Stack takes issue
with our normative claim and argues that the Constitution
should be interpreted differently, because it has a unique
source of democratic authority.92 In other words, Primus argues that the Constitution is not, in fact, interpreted differently
than other sources of law, whereas Stack argues that it should
be. Interestingly, then, we find ourselves in a curious triangular standoff where all three of us disagree with one another, but
on different grounds.
Looking more closely, however, there emerges a surprising
consensus: we all believe that the Constitution’s principal distinguishing feature may be the fact that people think the constitution is special—that it has a kind of mythological status. Our
subtler and more profound disagreement, then, may be
whether this constitutional culture marks a real difference,
and whether it is actually a sufficient justification for interpretive exceptionalism. We consider those questions below, and in
the process we also suggest that both Primus and Stack underappreciate the significance of the unusual role of stare decisis
in constitutional argument.

Primus focuses first on our claim that the text of the Constitution is interpreted differently from other legal texts, and
specifically that it is given less weight. He suggests that the
differences we observe come less from intrinsic attributes of the
text itself than from extrinsic characteristics of constitutional
litigation. He points first to the greater likelihood that issues of
statutory interpretation present novel questions for courts. In
other words, his intuition is that courts interpreting any
90
Richard A. Primus, The Cost of the Text, supra; Kevin M. Stack, The Inference from Authority to Interpretive Method in Constitutional and Statutory Domains, supra.
91
See Primus, supra note 90, at 2 (“[T]he textualism gap is mostly a product
of . . . the role of precedent and the costs of adhering to the wording of enacted
texts.”).
92
Stack, supra note 90, at 15 (“[D]istinct authority and roles of the Constitution and statutory law provide[ ] a foundation for divergence in how courts interpret these different forms of law.”).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN604.txt

2017]

unknown

DEBATE

Seq: 35

29-SEP-17

13:01

1683

sources of law look first to what other courts have said and
then to the text itself. Because of the Constitution’s relative
age and brevity, it is much more likely for there to be a welldeveloped line of cases interpreting every provision. Courts are
able to rely on prior judicial pronouncements and do not need
to reinterpret the text anew with each new constitutional case.
The same is less likely to be true of statutes, where novel questions implicating never-before parsed language are more common. This is plausible and, indeed, probable, and it may at
least partly account for what we characterized as a distinctive
lack of focus on text in constitutional argument.
However, it is not just the quantity of potentially applicable
precedent that is distinctive in constitutional interpretation,
but also its role and its character. Consider first its role. As we
argued, constitutional stare decisis is unusually weak, and
statutory stare decisis unusually strong relative to the benchmark of the common law.93 Even if there are more cases interpreting most constitutional provisions than statutory ones,
that still may not explain the relative unimportance of constitutional text if those greater number of cases are less binding
on subsequent courts. In other words, Primus’s useful observation pushes us to identify an interaction between the distinctiveness of constitutional textualism and constitutional
precedent.94 Yet even after considering that interaction, we are
not wholly convinced that the relative unimportance of the text
in constitutional interpretation can be fully or even largely attributed to the greater number of cases interpreting every
provision.
Moreover, the character of the precedent that Primus invokes as an alternative explanation for the seeming distinctiveness of constitutional interpretation reinforces our positive
claim that constitutional interpretation is special. Many constitutional decisions are characterized by soaring language, the
invocation of democratic first principles, and a focus on justice
and fairness.95 And even where the language of a decision is
more technical, the culture of constitutional exceptionalism is
93

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 87, at 738–41.
Although we did not explore the interactive effects of argument types in our
original article, we are happy to have the chance to do so here.
95
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The nature of
injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that
wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to
enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”).
94
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pervasive in the ways we originally identified, with the unusual
treatment of history, structure, and precedent itself.
What if Primus were to respond that the distinctive use of
precedent, too, is attributable more to context than to a distinctive interpretive attitude? Perhaps his argument is intended to
offer an example of a different kind of explanation for constitutional exceptionalism rather than a comprehensive rebuttal.
He might then push us to explore whether it would be possible
to offer a similar kind of account of each of the special forms of
constitutional interpretation we identify. On this view, differences in constitutional interpretation result not from different
deployments of text, structure, history, or precedent, but instead from differences of context that cause the same moves to
generate divergent interpretive outcomes. This is a provocative
idea, but we have trouble imagining whether or how it would
work.
Take precedent, for instance. One might expect that the
Constitution’s age—the attribute Primus emphasizes here—
would have an entrenching effect, because the relevant precedent would be tested and reliable. Yet we argued that exactly
the opposite is true; constitutional precedents are less binding
in practice than cases in other areas. We have similar difficulties imagining how context could account for the differences we
see in other types of interpretive argument. We showed, for
example, that structural issues can arise in statutory settings,
and yet courts deploy pure structural arguments only when
interpreting the Constitution. Likewise, we cannot see any reason why differences in litigation context would generate different approaches to history. So, in sum, we doubt that context
can account for all the differences we observe in our positive
argument. It seems more likely that lawyers are applying different interpretive techniques.
Primus’s second argument draws on a different kind of
contextual circumstance: he says that text matters less in constitutional interpretation because the cases tend to be more
important. As he puts it, rigid adherence to constitutional text
is more likely to “yield unacceptable results in fields of law too
important to be sacrificed to the abstract idea that plain language ought to govern.”96 Primus makes the claim with nuance and sophistication. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid
the impression that—for Primus’s lawyers and judges—constitutional cases may be especially important simply because they
96

Primus, supra note 90, at 9.
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involve the Constitution. He argues explicitly to the contrary,
acknowledging that all constitutional cases are not necessarily
important, and that some statutory cases are important in the
way he describes. That is undoubtedly correct. But the examples he offers do not always abide by those careful caveats.
For one, he looks to the recent case, King v. Burwell,97
interpreting the Affordable Care Act as allowing a subsidy
under both federal and state insurance exchanges, contrary to
at least part of the text of the statute. Primus thinks this case
demonstrates that courts ignore text in statutory cases too,
when the stakes are sufficiently high. But this case is not a
perfect example of the principle he is trying to establish. To our
eyes, the Court’s analysis in King looks more like conventional
textual analysis than the kind of flouting of text that occurs in
many constitutional cases. Admittedly, the narrow sentence at
issue appeared squarely to the contrary of the Court’s interpretation, but reading the text of the statute as a whole—as the
Court ultimately did—revealed a much more equivocal picture
that actually supported the Court’s holding. The case did not
so much involve the Court ignoring text as the Court adopting a
broader frame and interpreting the relevant provision in its
larger textual setting.98 Understood that way, the case represents a real attentiveness to text in a way that is rarer in constitutional interpretation.
Similarly, Primus looks to United Steelworkers v. Weber,99
the Title VII case that upheld affirmative action.100 Primus
argues that the Court did not allow the text of Title VII to
control because it was a case of intrinsic importance, and the
contrary result would have been too harmful. We suspect that
97

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Cf. Abbe Gluck, Congress Has a “Plan” and the Court Can Understand It –
The Court Rises to the Challenge of Statutory Complexity in King v. Burwell,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 8:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/
symposium-congress-has-a-plan-and-the-court-can-understand-it-the-courtrises-to-the-challenge-of-statutory-complexity-in-king-v-burwell/ [https://perma
.cc/2FSZ-NZGG] (noting the ways in which the King Court departed from rigid,
literalist textualism but then noting “[t]his is not to say that King is an atextual
decision. To the contrary, it turns on a sophisticated, close reading of the ACA’s
provisions and structure and it does not so much as whisper the phrase ‘legislative history.’”); Abbe Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 66
(2015) (“Textualism is chock full of rules that emphasize holistic interpretation —
rules that sit in some tension with other textualist rules that advance a laser
focus. One way to understand King is that the Chief Justice chooses the holistic
side of textualism, one that has always shared with purposivism the assumption
that Congress legislates rationally, with means to an end.”).
99
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
100
Primus, supra note 90, at 8 & nn.27–29.
98
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sense of importance arises in no small part because the case
was constitutionally inflected. While it did formally involve the
interpretation of Title VII, and while the opinion formally set
aside constitutional considerations, affirmative action must be
viewed through the lens of broader concerns. Justice Brennan
explained for the majority that Title VII was “a law triggered by
a Nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from
the American dream for so long.”101 It was part of a larger effort
to dismantle Jim Crow, much of which was state sponsored, of
course, including through government employment practices.
Justice Brennan said it would be “ironic indeed” if a law with
this purpose was read to prohibit efforts to combat racial injustice.102 It is this theme, which has unmistakable overtones
sounding in equal protection, that appeared to shape the
Court’s views.
Fundamentally, we agree with Primus that courts are less
likely to be bound by text when the stakes are particularly
high. But we suspect that courts often believe the stakes are
high when the Constitution is involved. This is not necessarily
so. Is carbon regulation under the Clean Air Act any less important than Free Speech, or even Equal Protection? There is
no reason in the abstract to think that this is true, although we
expect most lawyers will naturally elevate cases implicating the
latter precisely because they are constitutional. But at that
point, constitutional text is not de-emphasized because the
litigated cases are especially important; the text is de-emphasized because the cases are interpreting the Constitution. This
is precisely the constitutional exceptionalism that we seek to
challenge, or at least to spotlight.

Stack—unlike Primus—at least implicitly accepts our positive claim that the Constitution is interpreted differently than
other sources of law,103 but he disagrees with our normative
claim that this is not supported by any of the Constitution’s
unique attributes or claims to authority. He argues, first, that
stability is particularly important in constitutional law, and so
courts and commentators should adopt interpretive ap101

United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
103
Stack, supra note 90, at 3 (“[Serkin and Tebbe’s] thoughtful account of the
dimensions of divergence in current law and practice is likely to inspire many
forms of engagement.”).
102
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proaches that promote legal constancy. As he puts it, the Constitution should be interpreted differently from other sources of
law because it has “a different relation to stability and
continuity.”104
It is no doubt commonplace to think of the Constitution as
entrenched. In fact, we characterized it that way ourselves,
while still noting—as does Professor Stack—that other sources
of law can be equally binding in practice.105 But Professor
Stack is making a more profound claim, not just that the Constitution is difficult to change, but that its role in our legal
system is as a kind of stabilizing force, limiting legal change,
and that this should inform how it is interpreted.106 For Stack,
this justifies the special modes of constitutional interpretation.
We are unconvinced that the Constitution either does or
should play such a role. Descriptively, the distinctive role of
precedent in constitutional interpretation again appears to promote change as much as stability. We embrace—as we must—
Professor Stack’s focus on the heartland of cases rather than
outliers. After all, we too are focused on what we called the
overall “shape” of constitutional litigation, attempting to characterize it in the main and not on the margins. Even so, the
role that Professor Stack identifies for the Constitution sits
uncomfortably with the special treatment of constitutional precedent. If the over-arching goal of constitutional law is to create and preserve legal stability—regardless of content—then we
would expect precedent to have more force, not less. But that,
as we noted above and in the original article, is not how constitutional precedent traditionally operates.107
Normatively, too, we are open minded about the fluidity in
constitutional meaning that we see in actual practice. Constitutional protections are continuously changing through both
subtle adjustments and seismic shifts.108 Whether the issue is
equal protection, substantive due process, free exercise of religion, or even property protection, the only real constant is
change itself. Dynamism in constitutional law is the result of
interpretation and re-interpretation, and it is this tradition of
evolution that keeps it relevant. While we recognize this view is
104

Id. at 10.
Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 87, at 753–59.
106
Stack, supra note 90, at 11 (“[C]onstitutional law paradigmatically contains the legal and political aim of . . . creating a relative stability and continuity to
a greater extent than statutory law does.”).
107
See supra text accompanying note 93; Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 87, at
739–41.
108
Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 87, at 753–59.
105
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contested and that not everyone will agree, we are skeptical of
Stack’s positive claim that the Constitution constrains legal
change more than statutes or even the common law, as well as
his normative claim that it should.
Professor Stack’s second criticism is subtler but even more
provocative. He argues that the Constitution has a different
claim to democratic authority than does statutory law.109 Statutes—he says—represent the will of the legislature and therefore the popular majority by representation.110 Because
legislation contains the possibility of repeal or amendment
through the legislative process, its democratic legitimacy flows
from its passage and, for an existing statute, from the fact that
the legislature has not changed or repealed it. The Constitution, on the other hand, is countermajoritarian, and so must—
he argues—be representing a different body.111 The bottom
line for Professor Stack is that “statutory law and the Constitution have different sources of democratic authority in part because they represent different democratic bodies.”112 This, in
turn, generates different interpretive responsibilities.
Because the persistence of the Constitution does not reflect
even a tacit democratic acquiescence to its content among current citizens, its democratic legitimacy must come from some
other source. For Professor Stack, that source can be found in
the process of interpretation itself. He says succinctly:
“[I]nterpretation must itself play a role in identifying and sustaining a connection with the body that the Constitution claims
to represent.”113 That consideration is different from the interpretive concerns that guide statutory law, and so it justifies the
exceptionalism of constitutional interpretation.
This is fascinating and creative, but ultimately seems to us
like another instance of constitutional mythologizing. One of
the lessons of constitutional theory of the last two decades is
that constitutional meanings are made and unmade using familiar mechanisms, such as social mobilization, media coverage, political party pressure, legislative action, presidential
leadership, and so forth. The mechanisms are debatable and
debated, but the insights of popular constitutionalism suggest
109

Stack, supra note 90, at 6–10.
Id. at 7 (“Statutory law claims to represent and derive its authority from
representing the views of the legislative majority, and through it, the popular
majority.”).
111
Id. (noting that “the Constitution’s claim to represent a popular body cannot be a claim to represent the legislative majority”).
112
Id. at 8.
113
Id. at 9.
110
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that the Court is rarely out of step with popular majorities for
long.114 Ordinary people continually reclaim the Constitution,
not an abstract “We the People.” That means there is little need
for judges—and Stack’s account is closely centered on judges—
to deploy distinctive interpretive techniques in order to maintain or reflect its democratic authority. In a world of rough
consonance between democratic will and constitutional meaning, there is no need for special efforts at democratic
legitimation.115
Even if it were true that courts must take pains to reestablish democratic legitimacy whenever they interpret the
Constitution, at most this would affect how they talk about
constitutional meaning, and not the meaning itself. In other
words, nothing in Professor Stack’s account explains fully how
the difference in claims to democratic authority affect the substance of constitutional argument. The table-setting may be
different, but the meal is the same.
Perhaps, however, Stack means something even more subtle. In our original Article, we acknowledged that the Constitution occupies a distinct place in our culture. But we argued
that this venerated role may not justify the interpretive exceptionalism we see in practice. Yes, the Constitution is special,
but not in a way that necessarily makes the text less important,
precedent less binding, structure more relevant, nor history
more constrained. In other words, we challenged whether the
Constitution’s character made sense of the special interpretive
moves that we observed in practice.
But what if that has it backward? What if the purpose of
all these special interpretive moves is implicitly to establish
and reinforce the Constitution’s special place in legal culture?
Constitutional myth-making does not justify but is instead created—at least in part—by interpretive exceptionalism. In this
view, the question is simply whether the modes of constitutional argument help to render the Constitution distinctive.
This explanation does not require the kind of tight fit that we
demanded between cultural authority and interpretive argu114
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14
(2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court generally has adhered to the will of the
majority, and that the institution of judicial review itself has survived because the
people have approved of it).
115
If William Eskridge is right, something similar is true for statutes. And that
matters, because some key statutes are ancient and difficult to amend. William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479
(1987).
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ment. All that matters is that constitutional interpretation
contributes in some way—even if not precisely—to the Constitution’s authority.
This is an intriguing possibility, but raises the normative
question of whether constitutional mythologizing is an appropriate goal to pursue. We worried in our original piece that
invoking the Constitution functions like a political blunderbuss that silences genuine argument. It serves this role precisely because it is so venerated, but we view this as a possible
flaw, not a feature, of constitutional discourse. We are more
inclined to object to methods of interpretation that increase the
height of the pedestal on which the Constitution sits. And we
do so in light of the kinds of arguments that Stack articulates
to defend constitutional exceptionalism.
To press his point, Stack invokes past supermajorities and
inter-temporal subjects as providing the Constitution’s democratic force.116 He refers to the ways in which the Constitution
constitutes and symbolizes our political order. His is an elegant and skillful articulation of the deep intuitions at the heart
of our constitutional democracy. But it is also an aspect of
precisely the sort of constitutional mythologizing that we identify. If justifying the shape of constitutional argument requires
invoking some kind of pan-temporal immortal demos, then we
think the justification participates in the very phenomenon
that causes us concern.

Although Primus and Stack attack different aspects of our
Article—they address our descriptive and normative arguments, respectively—they both intersect with our deepest
claim, namely that it is the document’s mythological status, if
anything justifies the constitutional exceptionalism that we see
in legal interpretation. We take that common theme as an
invitation to attempt to restate our underlying concern with
this mythologizing.
One important aspect of the Constitution’s special cultural
status is that it seems to be shared by lawyers and citizens
outside the legal profession. So we see lawyers and judges
crafting interpretive arguments that perhaps both reflect but
also reinforce—constitute, we might say—the Constitution’s
unique status in American culture and politics. Whether this
interaction between professional and popular politics is a good
116

Stack, supra note 90, at 5–6.
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thing is something we are interested to explore, perhaps with
Primus and Stack if they are inclined to address it in their
responses. Our own intuition was, and remains, that constitutional mythologizing may actually impede democratic values by
insulating certain topics from political discourse because they
ostensibly concern higher-order lawmaking, which only constitutional lawyers and judges can and should be able to shape.
But perhaps this view is too simple, or too cynical. Regardless,
we continue to believe that no other attributes of the Constitution justify the constitutional exceptionalism we observe in
practice. Primus and Stack thus helpfully focus us more
closely on this central question: does the fact that people view
the Constitution as special justify interpreting it differently
than other sources of law? We think not, but now—thanks to
Primus and Stack—look forward to hearing whether and why
others disagree.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTANT
Richard Primus†
The Constitution embodies the deepest values of the American people. That feature of our political culture is constant.
As a result, the meaning of the Constitution changes over time.
The content of American values changes from generation to
generation, after all. So because the Constitution constantly
embodies our deepest values, the meaning of the Constitution
also changes. It has to, or else the Constitution would cease to
embody the American people’s deepest values.
The proposition that the Constitution embodies the deepest values of the American people is as robust and stable a
truth as exists in our political culture. It seems to be true all
the time, generation after generation, even in the face of tremendous change. American values change; circumstances
change; doctrines and institutions and methods of government
change. But whatever our deepest values are, and whatever we
understand to be our most basic commitments about government, will reliably be reflected in the Constitution. At any moment, there will be a correspondence between our deepest
values and the meaning of the Constitution as we understand
† Theodore J. St. Antoine Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law
School.
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it. That correspondence is what I am calling the constitutional
constant.
My claim about the constitutional constant presents a picture of constitutional law different from the one on offer in the
civics-book conception of the Constitution as a precommitment
strategy.117 On that familiar view, constitutional law is a system that overcomes pathological decisionmaking at Time 2 by
enforcing the decisions made at a more thoughtful Time 1. For
the system to work that way, the idea goes, the content of the
rules must be constant over time, so that the decision made at
Time 1 is in fact what will be enforced at Time 2. On that
model, change in the meaning of the Constitution over time
would be a fatal flaw.
Constitutional law in practice sometimes works the way
that the civics-book precommitment picture imagines.118
Much of the time it does not. Over the course of history, and
particularly where the most value-laden constitutional issues
have been concerned, the content of constitutional law has
been a variable rather than a constant, and the relevant
changes have usually come without formal amendments.119
The relevant variability is not of the kind where any constitutional rule in existence today might be different tomorrow, or
even next year. Most of the time, most things are stable, at
least in the short-to-intermediate run. But over the longer run,
even many fundamental things change substantially. The
scope of federal regulatory power under Article I,120 the re-

117
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”); see generally JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 37–38 (1979)
(discussing general examples of precommitment strategies).
118
To this point in history, for example, Americans have reliably enforced the
Time 1 decision to hold presidential elections every four years, rather than asking
in the face of various political exigencies whether this time we should just skip the
next election.
119
See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458–59 (2001).
120
Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Congress did
not have the power to regulate labor conditions), with United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Dagenhart in upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938).
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quirements of due process121 and equal protection,122 the nature of protected expression under the First Amendment123
and the limitations on firearms regulation under the Second124—all of these have changed over time. In short, and in
contrast to what simple forms of precommitment theory imagine, the content of constitutional rules over long stretches of
time is regularly not a constant. It is a variable.
What is constant is the correspondence between Americans’ deepest values and the meaning they attribute to the
Constitution. As Americans came to believe deeply in a cluster
of ideas about free speech and racial discrimination, those
ideas gave content to constitutional law and meaning to the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.125 To be sure, Americans
regularly disagree with one another about important normative
issues. We disagree about abortion and affirmative action, to
take two easy examples. While those disagreements rage, we
also disagree about what the Constitution directs on those subjects—just as we disagreed about what the Constitution directed with regard to racial segregation during the years when
Americans were deeply divided on that issue. When one side of
such a conflict prevails in the battle for mainstream American
values, the prevailing reading of the Constitution comes to
track the winning side’s conception. That prevailing reading,
which is then no longer one side’s view of a controversial question but a reflection of the dominant set of American values on
the matter in question, is then regarded as the meaning of the
Constitution.
121
Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia
sodomy law), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas
sodomy law as contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
122
Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racial segregation in public schools), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional).
123
Compare Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding a conviction under the California Criminal Syndicate Act based on involvement with an
organization of Communists), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(invalidating, on First Amendment grounds, a conviction under Ohio’s criminal
syndicalism statute).
124
Compare United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (allowing a restriction
on transporting certain shotguns when their relationship to the preservation of a
militia could not be shown), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (guaranteeing an individual’s right to possess a firearm unrelated to serving in a militia).
125
See, e.g., RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177–233
(1999) (identifying how European totalitarianism during World War II catalyzed
an American push towards constitutional rights relating to racial equality, free
speech, and open democratic politics).
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A few clarifications are in order here. First, when I speak of
the values or beliefs of Americans, my focus is on what we
might think of as the decision-making class: not a population
of hundreds of millions, but the smaller group of officials, activists, and opinion makers who wield power in the world of ideas
and who most shape the dominant public discourse, certainly
among professionals and probably among a broader public as
well. Second, I do not mean to suggest that even that smaller
population ever exhibits consensus in the sense of unanimous
opinion. When I speak of a prevailing view, or of the deeply
held values of Americans, I mean to refer to relatively broad
agreement within the decision-making class—a state of affairs
in which, within that class of Americans, an opinion is widely
held or at least rarely challenged.126
Moreover, when I say that the Constitution embodies the
deepest values of the American people, I do not mean to say
that just any values are likely to be read into the Constitution if
Americans are sufficiently committed to them (though that
might be true). Nor do I mean to suggest that constitutional
law traffics only in questions of values (thought that might be
true also). Rendered more precisely, my contention is that
there are two kinds of propositions that become propositions of
constitutional law when the American decision-making class
regards them as sufficiently important and sufficiently salient.
Building upon and partly adapting the work of Charles Black
and Phillip Bobbitt, we can call the two kinds of propositions
structural and ethical. A structural proposition is one that concerns the nature of, or the relationships among, the institutions of American government.127 An ethical proposition is one
about the American people’s self-conception as a polity; it concerns who we think we are as Americans, or perhaps who we
think we are at our best.128 Our collective self-conception—our
ethos—changes over time, as do our ideas about what governmental structure would best serve us in light of our ethos and
126
See generally Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1209–10 (2010) (exploring the role of consensus
within the decision-making class in shaping constitutional meaning).
127
See generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969) (explaining and recommending structural analysis in constitutional
decisionmaking).
128
See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
93–119 (1982) (developing the category of “constitutional ethos”); see also Richard
Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 79 (2010) (adapting
Bobbitt’s conception so that “constitutional ethos” means the general idea of the
polity’s self-conception, rather than just the particular self-conception for which
Bobbitt argued).
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our circumstances. Controversies about structure and ethos
are reflected in controversies about constitutional meaning.
And when there is broad agreement within the decision-making
class about an important matter of governmental structure or a
salient aspect of the American ethos, that agreement is reflected in the content of constitutional law. (The preceding sentence is a more fully specified version of the first sentence of
this essay.)
The correspondence between the content of constitutional
law and the decision-making class’s views on important matters of structure and ethos is what I am calling the constitutional constant. At any given time, constitutional law reflects
prevailing views on our most important issues of structure and
ethos, and it does so to the extent that there is broad agreement on the relevant question. The content of the decisionmaking class’s commitments on matters of structure and ethos
changes over time. But the correspondence between those
commitments and the content of constitutional law remains.
Whatever an elite American consensus regards as most fundamental to its system of government and its value-laden sense of
the national polity will be understood to be required by, and
embodied in, the Constitution. Indeed, that is why the content
of constitutional law changes over time. Our values change,
and what we require of our government changes. So to maintain the constitutional constant—that is, the correspondence
between the Constitution and our important commitments—
the meaning of the Constitution changes as well.
***
Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe argue that lawyers
tend to think of constitutional cases as distinctively important.129 I agree. But as my discussion of the constitutional
constant may suggest, my sense of the reason why lawyers
think of constitutional cases as distinctively important may
differ from Serkin and Tebbe’s.
Serkin and Tebbe take the view that constitutional cases
are deemed important because those cases are constitutional.
On that framing, whether a case is a constitutional case is a
fact independent of the case’s perceived importance. I suspect
that most constitutional lawyers would agree. On the most
conventional view, a “constitutional case” is one that raises an
129

NELL

Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORL. REV. 701 (2016).
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issue about the meaning of a clause in the Constitution, regardless of the importance of that issue. Serkin and Tebbe do
not specify whether they have that textual criterion for constitutionality in mind or whether, in their view, there is something
else that distinguishes constitutional cases from non-constitutional ones. But whatever it is that makes a case constitutional
in their view, it is apparently something independent of the
perceived importance of the issues it raises. Constitutionality
is the independent variable in their analysis, and the perception of importance the dependent one; the fact of constitutionality makes lawyers think of a case as important.
I suppose things do work that way sometimes. But in my
view, the judgment that a case raises a constitutional issue is
often not independent of a substantive judgment about the
importance of the issue raised. More particularly, the judgment that a case raises constitutional issues is not independent of the profession’s sense that the case implicates
fundamental questions about structure or ethos.130 In the year
1890, the state-court prosecution of an unlawyered felony defendant raised no constitutional problem. Today it does.131
When the legal profession’s prevailing intuitions about what is
fundamental to our constitutional structure and our constitutional ethos change, so does the profession’s sense of which
cases raise constitutional issues.
Serkin and Tebbe are accordingly correct, I think, to say
that American lawyers intuitively think of constitutional cases
as distinctively important. But that happens in part because
the cases we intuitively classify as structurally or ethically important get described as “constitutional.” The meaning of the
Constitution then adapts: we discover ways to read the Constitution’s text so that it speaks to the issues we regard as fundamentally important.132 As a result, the category of
“constitutional cases” is continually populated with the cases
that strike lawyers as raising the most salient questions of
governmental structure and national ethos. So yes, lawyers

130
Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079,
1129–35 (2013).
131
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth, guarantees felony
defendants legal representation even if they cannot afford it).
132
See Primus, supra note 130, at 1095–98 & nn.41–46 (describing constitutional textuality as a continuum along which substantive propositions move as
the legal profession’s intuitions about the merits of those propositions changes).
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think that constitutional cases are distinctively important.133
But they do so in large part because the distinctively important
cases have a way becoming “constitutional.”
Note here how Serkin and Tebbe write about United Steelworkers v. Weber,134 the decision in which the Supreme Court
upheld affirmative action in workplaces covered by Title VII. In
an earlier portion of this conversation, Serkin and Tebbe contended that lawyers and judges pay less attention to text in
constitutional cases than statutory ones.135 In response, I suggested that whether judges hew closely to enacted text may
depend more on the stakes of the case than on whether the text
at issue is part of the Constitution or part of the U.S. Code.136
Where there is a lot to lose, I argued, judges are more willing to
buck prior authority, including the authority of previously enacted text—and they are willing, when the stakes are high, to
buck not just constitutional text but statutory text as well. As
one of my examples of a high-stakes statutory case in which
the Supreme Court ignored enacted text, I offered Weber.137
Responding to that example, Serkin and Tebbe agree that the
Weber Court behaved nontextually but deny that Weber exemplifies statutory rather than constitutional interpretation.
Weber, Serkin and Tebbe say, was “constitutionally inflected,”
because the subject matter of affirmative action sounds in the
constitutional category of equal protection.138 Weber should
therefore be understood as a quasi-constitutional case, they
say, even though it was formally statutory. So in Serkin and
Tebbe’s view, Weber’s disregard for enacted text supports the
claim that it is in constitutional contexts that judges are prone
to behave nontextually.
I agree that there is a sense in which Weber was a constitutional case, or at least a constitutionalish one. The relevant
133
I mean this in a general way: it is a statement about lawyerly intuitions
toward the big categories of “constitutional cases” and “non-constitutional cases.”
When one gets down to particulars, it might turn out that the vast majority of
formally constitutional cases are not distinctively important, except of course to
the people directly affected. See infra note 142 (describing suppression motions
under the Fourth Amendment as typical constitutional cases). For further discussion of this point, see Primus, The Cost of the Text, supra, at 9–10.
134
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
135
See Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 129, at 718–19.
136
See Primus, The Cost of the Text, supra note 133, at 7–11. To be precise, I
suggested that it depends partly on the distinction between high-stakes cases and
low-stakes cases and partly on the distinction between cases in thickly developed
doctrinal areas and cases raising questions of first impression. See id. at 10.
137
Id. at 8.
138
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Mythmaking in Constitutional Interpretation: A Response to Primus and Stack, supra, at 4.
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sense of “constitutional” is substantive rather than formal.
What makes affirmative action under Title VII a “constitutionally inflected” issue, to use Serkin and Tebbe’s term, is not
merely that affirmative action cases arising under Title VII raise
issues that overlap with the issues raised by cases arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The deeper reason why
affirmative action seems “constitutionally inflected” even when
the legal issue in a case is formally statutory is that issues of
racial equality are important to the American constitutional
ethos, and being important to the constitutional ethos is what
makes an issue constitutional. In other words, Weber is substantively constitutional for the same reason that Fisher v.
Texas139 is: because it raises an important ethical issue.140
Preserving the idea that judges reason nontextually in constitutional cases more than in statutory ones by classifying
formally statutory cases like Weber as substantively constitutional is a perfectly defensible move on its own terms. But it
requires adopting a view of the relevant difference between constitutional and non-constitutional cases that largely tracks a
distinction that I suggested does much of the real work of determining when judges are willing to depart from textual authority: the distinction between ordinary cases and cases
where judges feel there is a lot to lose.141 In other words, the
fact that a case raises high-stakes issues of structure and
ethos has at least two sets of consequences. Judges are more
likely to reason nontextually, and the legal profession is more
likely to regard the case as constitutional. But neither of those
consequences is caused by the other one. Judges in a case like
Weber do not first think, “This case is important, so we regard
it as constitutional,” and then proceed to think, “This case is
constitutional, so we might not hew to the text.” Instead, it is
the fact that the case raises the high-stakes issue it raises that
drives both the judges’ willingness to depart from enacted text
and our intuition that the issue is in some sense constitutional.
I do not mean to suggest that the constitutionality of a case
is always just a consequence of some anterior perception of its
importance.142 But the category “constitutional cases” attracts
139

136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
See Primus, supra note 130, at 1132–35 (describing ethos as a basis for
constitutional status).
141
Primus, The Cost of the Text, supra note 133, at 9 & 11.
142
Indeed, I do not think that it is true that (formally) constitutional cases in
general are regarded as particularly important—though of course many are. For
every case in which a court orders a state to recognize same-sex marriage, there
are thousands of cases in which courts adjudicate suppression motions under the
140
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and assimilates the cases that strike lawyers as raising the
most important issues of structure and ethos. Sometimes, as
in Weber, we continue to regard a case as technically nonconstitutional even though we also perceive a sense in which
the case is constitutional. At other times, we develop new readings of the Constitution itself in order to make the Constitution
bear on our most salient questions.143 In so doing, we perpetuate one of the intuitions that Serkin and Tebbe identify: that
constitutional cases are distinctively important. After all, the
questions in which we are most invested somehow turn out to
be constitutional questions. As must be true, if the Constitution is always going to embody our most important
commitments.144
***
Serkin and Tebbe’s claim that American lawyers think of
constitutional cases as having an especially elevated status is
consistent with my view that Americans constantly reimagine
constitutional law so that it speaks to our most fundamental
Fourth Amendment. Suppression motions are often important—particularly to
the defendants who raise them. But to the judges who adjudicate them, suppression motions might be important in an ordinary sort of way, rather than in the
special way that same-sex marriage cases were important in the last several
years. The sense that constitutional cases are distinctively important is thus
driven, I think, by the profession’s tendency to let the most salient constitutional
cases color an impression of the entire category.
143
See Primus, supra note 130, at 1095–98 & nn.41–46 (discussing this process of textual reconciliation).
144
Serkin and Tebbe respond to my other leading example of a statutory case
in which the Court departed from enacted text—King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015)—by arguing that the Court in King actually did pay much closer attention
to the text than it usually does in constitutional cases. And it is true that the
Court engaged closely with the enacted statutory wording in King, though it did so
en route to a decision that refused to give legal force to a key bit of enacted text. I
do not think, however, that the Court’s close engagement with enacted text in
King lacks parallels in cases arising under the Constitution. Consider District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in which the Court held that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess certain kinds of firearms. The
Heller Court engaged closely and at great length with the wording of the Second
Amendment, and so did Justice Stevens’s Heller dissent. I would agree that
Heller’s in-the-weeds engagement with the wording of the Constitution is unusual
in modern constitutional law, and I would further agree that such close engagement with enacted text is more common in statutory cases. But as I have previously argued, I think that much of the explanation for that difference lies with the
fact that statutory cases present more questions of first impression about the
meaning of enacted text than constitutional cases do. Heller was a constitutional
case of first impression regarding the meaning of a constitutional text, and,
presented with that case, the Court engaged with the enacted wording of the
Constitution at least as closely as the King Court engaged with the enacted wording of the U.S. Code.
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concerns. But Serkin and Tebbe have some worries about that
dynamic. One worry is that if Americans code their most important issues as constitutional, there will be a tendency for
those issues to be taken out of ordinary political discussion
and relegated to the domain of professional elites.145 Another
is that the constitutionalization of the polity’s most important
issues raises the stakes of political conflict and reduces the
available space for compromise.146
The first worry can be understood either as a concern that
courts will decide issues that are better left to the normal political process or as a concern that people who are not constitutional lawyers will shrink from engaging with important issues
because those issues seem to require a refined and technical
treatment that is beyond the abilities of laypeople. On the first
conception, the worry strikes me as reasonable. If prevailing
understandings of the Constitution evolve as the norms of
American elites change, and if courts understand themselves
as authorized to countermand the decisions of other institutions on the basis of their understandings of the Constitution,
then courts will probably decide some number of issues that
are better decided by other institutions. To be sure, people will
differ as to the particulars here, and we would need a robust
theory of judicial review to sort out when courts should and
should not intervene. Over-judicialization is to be avoided, but
so is under-judicialization, and trying to figure out how to avoid
both problems is one of the longer-lived preoccupations of
American constitutional theory.
If Serkin and Tebbe are also worried about the second version of this problem, however, then I do not think I share their
concern. Yes, there is a risk that courts will decide issues that
are better resolved in other forms. But I doubt that the American tendency to understand our most salient questions of
structure and ethos as constitutional questions has the effect
of discouraging people who are not professional constitutional
lawyers from engaging vigorously with those questions. As far
as I can tell, there is a robust lay discourse about guns, gay
marriage, affirmative action, abortion, the Affordable Care Act,
and many other issues denominated “constitutional.” If there
is evidence that ordinary Americans, or members of the decision-making class other than lawyers and judges, regularly
decline to express themselves on these matters because they
believe the topics require professionally expert resolution, I am
145
146

Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 138, at 8.
Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 129, at 776.
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not aware of it. Indeed, I think it at least as likely that broad
public discussion on several of those issues influences the judiciary as it is that the way the issues are discussed by elite
lawyers limits the speech, thought, or activism of other interested Americans.
I do suspect, however, that Serkin and Tebbe are correct to
worry about the other concern they express. Precisely because
Americans intuitively regard the Constitution as embodying
their deepest values, disagreement about constitutional law
can seem like fundamental disagreement. And where disagreement is fundamental, people often find it hard to recognize the
legitimacy of differing views.
In my own view, a polity is generally healthier when the
members of its decision-making class are able, across a relatively broad range of issues, to recognize the legitimacy of different ideas. Indeed, I am attracted to the idea that the
Constitution works best when it is understood to provide for
governance that assumes important disagreement within the
polity, rather than when it is understood to resolve all such
disagreement. The Constitution, as Holmes remarked, is made
for people of fundamentally different views.147 But it is also
true, as I noted earlier, that the meaning of the Constitution
adapts over time so as to continually embody the deepest commitments of the American decision-making class. It follows
that Americans are unlikely to see the Constitution as neutral
on the polity’s most salient issues. We have fundamentally
differing views, and, much of the time, we each see our views
reflected in the Constitution.
So perhaps the key questions are these: Can members of
the decision-making class recognize the existence of a gap, at
any given time, between their own views on issues of structure
and ethos—even their own fundamental views on those issues—and the views of the American people, or at least those of
the decision-making class, as a whole? Can they recognize,
when such a gap exists, that the text of the Constitution might
not settle the question one way or the other? Put differently, if
two people have different and deeply held views about federal
power or affirmative action, must each one regard the other as
betraying the Constitution? Or can they think that the content
of the Constitution might be indeterminate on the issue that
divides them, at least until such time as one of them succeeds
in persuading the broader polity to adopt one set of views? The
147

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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latter frame of mind is harder to maintain, especially in the
heat of mass politics. But it would surely make for a healthier
constitutional culture.
Serkin and Tebbe worry that by treating the Constitution
as special, Americans raise the stakes of politics in unhealthy
ways. There is a sense in which I think they are right. But
perhaps the problem is less that we treat constitutional issues
as especially important than it is that we treat too many commitments as not subject to reasonable disagreement. If we
were better able to tolerate disagreement, we might be better
able to tolerate disagreement about the Constitution. And disagreement about the Constitution is not going away, precisely
because of a deep respect in which the Constitution is special:
even as American values change over time, the Constitution
embodies the deepest values of the American people, and when
we disagree about what our values should be, we disagree
about the meaning of the Constitution. That feature of the
Constitution may not be unique; indeed, one could probably
say similar things about at least some other sacred texts that,
for particular communities, have the status of higher law. But
it does seem deserving of the label “special.” And to this point
in history, it also seems to have been reliably constant.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATCHET EFFECT
Kevin M. Stack†
Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe take an inductive
and empirical approach to constitutional interpretation and
elaboration. They ask whether attributes of the Constitution
justify interpretive exceptionalism—that is, interpreting and
elaborating the Constitution differently than other forms of
law.148 They conclude that the characteristics of the Constitution they consider do not justify interpretive exceptionalism—
at most, the “Constitution’s principal distinguishing feature
may be the fact that people think the Constitution is special—
that it has a kind of mythological status.”149 As Serkin and
Tebbe see it, the extent to which individuals view the Constitu† Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. I am grateful to Chris Serkin for
helpful comments.
148
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 703–04, 749–51 (2016).
149
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Mythmaking in Constitutional Interpretation: A Response to Primus and Stack, supra, at 1.
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tion or constitutional law as special is best explained with reference to a broad cultural gloss, a shared ascription of a
particular kind of value to the Constitution rather than any
particular feature of our existing Constitution or constitutional
law.150 As a result, interpretive exceptionalism appears to be
founded on accepting a mythology of the Constitution’s and
constitutional law’s special character.151 That thought in turn
prompts Serkin and Tebbe to worry about the ways in which
this cultural identification and valorization of the Constitution
poses distinctive risks.152
I take up their invitation to consider those risks below, but
first notice how different Serkin and Tebbe’s approach to constitutional theory and law is from more deductive and topdown theories. Under a more deductive approach, it does not
make sense to ask whether observed features of the Constitution (such as the generality of its terms) are able to justify a
distinct interpretive approach.153 Rather, a justification for the
Constitution’s special treatment follows from arguments about
the Constitution’s distinctive authority or distinctive legal
role—that is, premises of constitutionalism. On this view, the
project of constitutional theory is to provide an account of how
constitutional law performs a special function in our legal system, and then to develop interpretive theories on the basis of
that ascribed function. The arguments for the divergence in
constitutional and statutory interpretation that I make in my
first response proceed from that perspective.154
From Serkin and Tebbe’s more empirical viewpoint, they
want a showing—some proof—that constitutional law actually
performs a distinctive function before they will endorse its distinctive interpretive treatment. For instance, they insightfully
argue that constitutional law may not be particularly entrenched in the sense of being less subject to change than other
kinds of legal arrangements.155 So why, they wonder, does it
makes sense to continue to think of the Constitution and constitutional laws as distinctively serving a preservationist func150
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 771–72;
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 149, at 8.
151
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 149, at 7.
152
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 775–76;
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 149, at 7–8.
153
Kevin M. Stack, The Inference from Authority to Interpretive Method in Constitutional and Statutory Domains, supra, at 5–6.
154
See Stack, supra note 153.
155
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 753–59.
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tion.156 In this sense and others, they insist that constitutional
practices should bear out the premises of any constitutional
theory, otherwise claims of constitutional authority or function
are perpetuating a mythology. This raises deep questions
about the aims of constitutional theory, and the relationship
between more ideal theory and a cultural study of the practices
we identify as constitutional.157
We need not resolve those higher-order questions, however, because even when we take a more empirical approach,
grounds for divergence in constitutional and statutory interpretation still emerge. These arguments for interpretive divergence arise as responses to observed pathologies. Consider, for
instance, Serkin and Tebbe’s concern that the pervasive view of
the Constitution as special produces distinctive risks. The
constitutional risks they have in mind might be conceived as a
constitutional ratchet with three elements.
The first concerns use of the Constitution in politics. If the
Constitution is viewed as a repository of our deepest values,158
politics can take strategic advantage by casting issues in constitutional terms.159 Framing an issue in constitutional terms,
when successful, “insulat[es] certain topics from political discourse because they ostensibly concern higher-order lawmaking.”160 Second, and closely related, that constitutional
framing distances consideration of an issue from the normal
politics that takes place in elected bodies and administrative
agencies. It also augments the role of legal argumentation.161
In particular, once an issue is decided or framed in constitutional terms, the wide range of policy and evaluative concerns
that might otherwise bear on its resolution must be translated
into the terms of constitutional argument and accorded the
weight that constitutional law grants them. Third, the Constitution’s special status in our culture may make it particularly
tempting for courts to enlarge the range of issues for which

156

Id. at 758–59.
See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 37 (1999) (explicating the conditions and aims of a cultural study of
law).
158
See Richard Primus, The Constitutional Constant, supra, at 1–2; cf. Serkin
& Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 771.
159
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 775 (commenting on reasons political actors invoke constitutional categories).
160
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 149, at 8.
161
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 148, at 772–73.
157

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN604.txt

2017]

unknown

DEBATE

Seq: 57

29-SEP-17

13:01

1705

constitutional law provides an answer,162 often in the form of a
constitutional right.
When these dynamics operate together, they have a ratchet
effect of transforming more and more of our political landscape
into constitutional politics. On the one hand, the Constitution’s special status as a repository of our deepest values
means that what is constitutional not only changes with our
values,163 but changes in a way that expands the scope of
issues touched by constitutional law. But once an issue is
accorded a constitutional status or right, it alters normal politics about the issue, and to the extent that courts become the
privileged forum for resolution of those issues, argument about
the merits must move within the constrained model of practical
reasoning provided by constitutional argument. As issue after
issue is resolved in a form of constitutional law rather than
resting primarily under the power of municipal governments,
common law courts, state legislatures, Congress, or the federal
executive, our already judicialized government becomes subject to the courts in a more profound way.
At an admittedly high level of abstraction, this constitutional ratchet effect may provide a diagnosis of an important
dynamic or even pathology within American constitutionalism.
It also seems to capture what Serkin and Tebbe worry are the
risks or downsides of our view of the Constitution as distinctively important and special in ways that are difficult to tie to
its attributes. Let us suppose that this ratchet effect obtains
and describes a dynamic in American constitutionalism.
Doesn’t it, too, have implications for constitutional interpretation and elaboration?
I could imagine several ways in which it would justify principles of constitutional interpretation and elaboration. Here is
one way that argument might proceed: lawyers and the public
view the Constitution and constitutional law as distinctively
important, and the way which they do so ends up producing
the ratchet effect just described. Assuming that effect is generally undesirable—whether because it unduly impinges on the
scope of issues subject to democratic resolution or for some
other reason—an implementing rule could help check the judiciary’s tendency to enlarge the scope of issues to which the
Constitution provides an answer.
162
Cf. id. at 776 (asserting that political actors leverage the lofty status of
constitutional law in political warfare).
163
Primus, The Constitutional Constant, supra note 158, at 1–2.
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Such implementing rules have deep roots in the American
constitutional tradition. One such rule, framed as a “rule of
administration,” was defended by James B. Thayer in his classic article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law.164 Thayer argued that when courts are
faced with a question of whether legislation is constitutional,
the question they should ask themselves is whether “the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt.”165 As Thayer elaborates this defense of a
kind of constitutional minimalism, he argues that “the ultimate
question is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but
whether legislation is sustainable or not.”166 Thayer’s rule, developed with regard to the dangers of judicial review of legislation in particular, could be generalized to help address the
judicial tendency of finding too many constitutional answers,
with courts asking whether the Constitution is clearly violated.
I do not mean to suggest that an approach that mirrors
Thayer’s is the only inference that could be made from the
ratchet effect, or that such a doctrinal standard would always
be effective.167 But if we see the constitutional ratchet effect as
a consequence of the way in which judges mythologize the Constitution, that observation can provide a foundation for principles of constitutional interpretation along the lines that Thayer
proposed. Notice that this type of argument for interpretive
exceptionalism has a different character than more deductive
arguments from constitutional authority that Serkin and Tebbe
want to avoid. It begins with an account of political risks or
pathologies and defends interpretive principles to address
those risks. For Serkin and Tebbe, the focus would be on addressing the constitutional ratchet or other implications of our
cultural ascription of value to the Constitution. Others, such
as Adrian Vermeule, have generalized this inquiry, developing a
theory of the Constitution based on an understanding of how
well it manages certain political risks.168 Following this path
leads to arguments for interpretive exceptionalism, but based
on functional accounts of risk or institutional tendencies. So
even if we proceed, with Serkin and Tebbe, by focusing on how
we view the Constitution, not theoretical arguments about au164

7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139–40 (1893).
Id. at 140 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (1811) (Chief
Justice Tilghman)).
166
Id. at 150.
167
See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 54–56 (2014) (examining a critique of “parchment barriers”).
168
See id.
165
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thority, why don’t those differences, and the dynamics they
create, also provide grounds to apply different interpretive principles in the constitutional and statutory domains?
JUST LAW
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe†
INTRODUCTION
What if the Constitution were interpreted as just another
source of law? What if it were understood as the product of
political compromise—necessarily flawed rather than infallible—and then construed in ordinary ways? In our original Article, we argued that the Constitution is subject to exceptional
forms of legal interpretation involving distinctive treatments of
history, text, precedent, and structure.169 We then explored
the possible justifications for that practice, and we found them
mostly unconvincing.170 We noticed a gap between interpretive
arguments directed toward the Constitution and its attributes
or claims to authority.171 What most convincingly sets the
Constitution apart, we suggested, is the very fact that Americans regard it as special—that it occupies an exceptional place
in the political culture.172 And we questioned whether that
characteristic could justify the interpretive exceptionalism that
we see in everyday lawyering.173
In our subsequent exchange with Richard Primus and Kevin Stack, a fair bit of agreement has developed—at least for
the sake of the instant argument. If we are reading them correctly, they now concur that lawyers do in fact deploy distinctive interpretive arguments in constitutional cases.174 Second,
they acknowledge, if only implicitly or arguendo, that it is hard
†

Thanks to Aziz Rana for his help on an earlier version.
Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
170
Id. at 749–75.
171
Id. at 705–06.
172
Id. at 771–75.
173
Id. at 774–75.
174
Richard A. Primus, The Constitutional Constant, supra, at 3–4. Primus’s
agreement on this point depends on his argument that categorizing a case as
“constitutional” depends partly on lawyers’ perception that it raises important
issues. We address this argument in a moment. Kevin M. Stack, The Inference
from Authority to Interpretive Method in Constitutional and Statutory Domains,
supra, at 3 (“[Serkin and Tebbe’s article] carefully and compactly chronicles differences in the interpretive norms (what they call arguments) applied by courts when
faced with statutory and constitutional questions. Their thoughtful account of
169
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to justify that practice except by reference to the political and
cultural reverence that surrounds the document.175 Third,
they recognize costs associated with constitutional exceptionalism, in particular the danger of excessive judicialization and
the way constitutional exceptionalism raises the stakes of disagreement, making political compromise more difficult. They
recognize both of these as real dangers.176 However, Professors
Primus and Stack have pushed us to think more deeply about
the scope, consequences and inevitability of constitutional mythologizing. Most recently, in their excellent sur-responses,
they encourage us to vary our concept of what counts as
“constitutional.”
I
CONSTITUTIONAL CATEGORIZING
Both Primus and Stack observe, interestingly and independently, that the boundaries of constitutional law shift over
time. Primus argues that they change as Americans’ fundamental values evolve and get coded as constitutional. What he
calls the “constitutional constant” is that the issues dubbed
“constitutional” always reflect lawyers’ fundamental values regarding government structure and national ethos.177 Though
the values themselves change, the fact of their constitutionalization does not. In a sense, he argues that the category “constitutional” is defined by core values on questions of structure
and ethos, whatever they may be at any moment in time.
We initially meant something more straightforward by the
term “constitutional”—we meant to invoke lawyers’ conventional conceptions of the category. So we argued that United
Steelworkers v. Weber,178 the challenge to affirmative action
the dimensions of divergence in current law and practice is likely to inspire many
forms of engagement.”).
175
Primus, Constitutional Constant, supra note 174, at 8 (describing “a deep
respect in which the Constitution is special: even as American values change over
time, the Constitution embodies the deepest values of the American people, and
when we disagree about what our values should be, we disagree about the meaning of the Constitution”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Ratchet Effect, supra,
at 1 (assuming that the Constitution is regarded as special and arguing that such
perception justifies distinctive interpretive practices).
176
Primus, Constitutional Constant, supra note 174, at 6–7 (sharing the worry
that too many disputes will be judicialized, and agreeing that constitutionalization can make compromise more difficult); Stack, Ratchet Effect, supra note 175,
at 2 (building an argument for interpretive distinctiveness based on “[Serkin and
Tebbe’s] worry that problems or pathologies follow from our viewing the Constitution as special”).
177
Primus, Constitutional Constant, supra note 174, at 3–4.
178
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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under Title VII, was “constitutionally inflected” not because it
implicated fundamental values, but simply because its resolution was closely connected to the fate of affirmative action
under the Equal Protection Clause.179 But we think Primus is
right to push us to consider the category of constitutional law
as a variable, rather than a constant.
Stack also notices that the category can expand, but he
focuses on how that can happen for strategic reasons, as lawyers and judges seek to leverage the argumentative advantages
of constitutional discourse.180 In this way, constitutional law
can colonize other areas of legal doctrine. Because the incentives push this dynamic mostly in one direction, he calls it a
ratchet effect.
According to both Primus and Stack, moreover, attending
to the Constitution’s shifting boundaries yields reasons for interpretive exceptionalism. Primus seems to believe that the
Constitution’s distinctive relationship to fundamental values
gives lawyers a reason to treat it differently from other legal
authorities. He implies that the “constitutional constant” explains why lawyers separate out cases implicating fundamental
values.181 Once you understand that any case implicating basic values counts as constitutional, then you can see that legal
professionals deploy distinctive arguments in such cases.
Here, Primus subtly recasts our original observation: lawyers
do indeed interpret the Constitution distinctively, once the category is understood to include all basic commitments on questions of structure and ethos.
And, he suggests in his latest response, there may be good
justifications for their special argumentation. Lawyers and
judges may fashion interpretive rules that lower the two most
serious costs of constitutionalization, namely over-judicialization and heightening the stakes of disagreement so that com179
Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Mythmaking in Constitutional Interpretation: A Response to Primus and Stack, supra, at 4.
180
Stack, Ratchet Effect, supra note 175, at 3.
181
This is a subtle shift from Primus’s first argument, which was that the
Constitution isn’t special, at least with regard to textual argument—constitutional
law just happens to include really important cases. And their importance presses
judges to depart from the text to reach the right result. We responded that these
cases might seem important precisely because they involve the Constitution.
Serkin & Tebbe, Mythmaking, supra note 179, at 4. Now Primus responds that at
least some cases are not important simply because they concern the Constitution;
they are coded as “constitutional” because they implicate basic values. He seems
to be suggesting that perhaps constitutional interpretation is distinctive, if you
define “constitutional” capaciously enough to include all cases concerning fundamental values on questions of structure and ethos.
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promise becomes more difficult. Primus himself urges lawyers
and judges to better tolerate disagreement about the meaning
of the Constitution—not by denying that fundamental values
are at stake, but by realizing that there can be reasonable
disagreement about those basic values.182
For Stack, the ratchet effect increases constitutionalization’s dangers. Lawyers and judges might resist those dangers,
however, by fashioning interpretive approaches to slow or limit
constitutional creep. He offers, for example, Thayerian
minimalism—an approach that limits the circumstances under
which legal questions are answered by the Constitution. It is
possible to avoid the costs we identify by realizing that the
Constitution does not provide a clear resolution of every legal
dispute—and where its meaning is unclear, courts should decline to use the Constitution as a basis for striking down democratically enacted laws.183
We are open to this line of inquiry. As we acknowledged
initially, the mythological status of the Constitution may well
give lawyers and judges reasons to interpret it differently in
some respects (though we expressed doubt that it could justify
every interpretive difference we observe in professional practice).184 And if the category “constitutional” implicates
whatever disputes are most important or fundamental, even
cases that technically concern statutory law or common law,
then there may well be a reason to direct distinctive arguments
to those legal authorities. In particular, the costs associated
with the tendency of lawyers to constitutionalize cases may
warrant distinctive approaches.
Provocative suggestions like those of Primus and Stack
naturally raise as many questions as they answer. And we
have some questions here. Primus, for one, believes that constitutional inquiry and therefore constitutional interpretation
are extended to any legal question implicating lawyers’ values
on fundamental questions of structure and ethos. It follows—
at least implicitly—that special interpretive rules may well be
justified by the inherent importance of the issues, if not by any
particular characteristics of the Constitution more narrowly
defined. While we are open to the suggestion that important or
core questions deserve special interpretive rules, it is less clear
182

Primus, Constitutional Constant, supra note 174, at 7–8.
Stack, Ratchet Effect, supra note 175, at 3–4.
184
Serkin & Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, supra note 169, at 773–74
(“Conceivably, the Constitution’s central place in American legal mythology could
translate into distinctive interpretive moves.”).
183
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what those rules should be and whether they correspond in
any way to the rules that we actually observe in constitutional
practice.
Why, for example, should text and precedent be treated
differently because the issue is especially important? While we
could imagine a normative justification that text and precedent
should matter less, because courts should be less attentive to
legal stability than to reaching the “right” result in such important or core cases, we could imagine the opposite, too—that
legal stability is especially desirable where the stakes of the
case are high. Over-judicialization may be especially dangerous in such cases as well. In short, defining constitutional
cases as including all those that raise fundamental commitments, as Primus suggests, may well justify different modes of
constitutional argument. However, it is less clear to us what
those modes of argument should be, and it seems unlikely that
they correspond to the observed practice that we originally
identified.
Stack suggests that constitutional exceptionalism may be
justified by lawyers who wish to shrink the domain of constitutional argument by engaging in a form of minimalism that allows policy issues to be resolved in the language of ordinary law
and policy without invoking a constitutional answer. That
would keep some issues out of court altogether, and it would
lower the stakes of many other disputes, enabling compromise.
Questions that never become constitutional are more likely to
be resolved within normal political discourse.
Stack’s worry is consistent with our own. But here we
wonder about the inevitability of the phenomenon he identifies,
and of minimalism as the response. In fact, constitutionalizing
may not always have a ratchet effect, and questions can actually be de-constitutionalized. This has happened before, of
course. Issues have been taken out of the domain of constitutional adjudication and placed back in the realm of ordinary
law and politics. Think of 1937, when the Supreme Court began to treat national economic questions as matters of ordinary
policymaking that were within the discretion of legislators and
other lawmakers.185 Or think of 1990, when the Court announced that claims for religious exemptions could no longer
be made under the Free Exercise Clause.186 And today the
185
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
186
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Religious exemptions became available only under statutory law, see Religious Freedom Restoration Act
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Court has been trying to extricate itself from both the Takings
Clause and the Establishment Clause by erecting barriers to
adjudication.187 Of course, many conservatives have been trying to de-constitutionalize the right to terminate a pregnancy
for decades.
But there is another available response to the ratchet danger. Instead of narrowing the scope of constitutional law, lawyers could diminish the significance of categorizing a dispute
as constitutional. We offer this argument tentatively. If constitutional law were regarded as merely another source of law—
not necessarily implicating our basic values, but resulting from
compromise—then the consequences of constitutionalization
could well be reduced. Moreover, there would be less incentive
for lawyers and judges to ratchet up the level of authority. And,
to circle back to our original point, it would become even
harder to justify special interpretive arguments. Of course,
demythologizing the Constitution would have downsides that
would need to be carefully considered. But reading Primus and
Stack makes us think that Americans should have that normative conversation.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINGENT
However constitutional boundaries are drawn, and however fluid they are, we all seem to agree that the Constitution
does, in fact, enjoy a kind of mythological status in our legal
system. It is not just supreme in the sense that it trumps other
law, but is especially revered. The final question Primus and
Stack at least implicitly push us to consider is whether this
mythologizing is normatively desirable, or whether it comes
with particular dangers.
Notably, neither Primus nor Stack actually defends the
sacred cultural status of the Constitution. Primus simply says
that the “constitutional constant”—the reality that the Constitution embodies basic commitments regarding structure and
ethos, even as those values shift—is as close to a fixed feature
of American political life as exists. And if it were inevitable,
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006), or state statutory or constitutional law.
187
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007)
(rejecting taxpayer standing for a particular type of Establishment Clause challenge); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (holding
that issue preclusion prevents federal courts from hearing takings challenges
already litigated in state court, even when state court litigation is required to ripen
a takings claim).
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that would be enough; there would be no reason to consider
normative arguments for or against constitutional mythmaking. With Primus, we could simply urge lawyers and judges to
tolerate disagreement about the meaning of the Constitution,
even though it embodies our most profound commitments
about government structure and American ethos.
Yet we have some doubts. Although neither of us is a professional historian, we wonder whether the Constitution really
has always been regarded as an embodiment of ultimate values, even just among lawyers and even just on questions of
structure and ethos. It seems to us equally possible that for
much of the early republic—perhaps through and including
Reconstruction—the Constitution was viewed as the product of
compromise, at best, and not the object of a consensus on
national commitments. It might have been understood as a
framework for working together rather than an idealization of
American values.188 Of course, the Constitution trumped
other laws in the event of conflict, but perhaps only in the same
way that other laws superseded inferior rules.189
Universal support for the Constitution might instead be the
product of an American nationalism that arose later, in the
context of economic integration and global warfare.190 This is
at least a conceivable reading. Viewed in historical perspective,
in other words, the contemporary consensus is just as likely to
appear contingent, not constant.
Even today, we wonder whether the “constitutional constant” is really so constant. Again, most economic questions
were de-constitutionalized in the late 1930s. Do economic concerns not present questions that are fundamental to the American ethos?191 Yet there is agreement (itself contingent) that
188
See Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 382 (2015).
189
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 17–18 (2008) (suggesting
that, at the time of the Founding, judges made constitutional decisions in the
same way they made other decisions); see also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 129–30 (2013) (arguing that
the Framers interpreted the Constitution and statutes with substantially similar
methods).
190
Rana, supra note 188, at 340 (arguing that “in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, significant popular skepticism actually existed concerning the basic legitimacy of the text, voiced at times even by future presidents and
sitting judges” but that against the backdrop of international conflicts during this
time period that led to World War I, “a combination of corporate, legal, and
military elites initiated a concerted campaign to establish constitutional support
as the paramount prerequisite of loyal citizenship”).
191
Some have sought to revive the constitutional commitment to economic
equality. Their project underscores the fact that economic unfairness is not today
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they do not raise constitutional questions, or at least not constitutional questions that are susceptible to adjudication (that
said, the fact that some libertarians are trying to revitalize the
Privileges and Immunities Clause precisely to enable rights of
property and contract provides some support for Primus
here).192
If our skepticism regarding the “constitutional constant” is
justified, or even just plausible, then theorists would do well to
start thinking about whether its mythological status is desirable as a matter of American political morality. That project is
far beyond the scope of this exploratory essay, although we can
imagine in broad strokes some of the likely arguments on both
sides.193
On the one hand, the concerns that we have identified—
and that Primus and Stack seem to share—would be mitigated
by demythologizing the Constitution. In particular, arguments
from the Bill of Rights or the Commerce Clause would no longer
raise the moral stakes, making compromise more difficult. And
lawyers might be less tempted to constitutionalize their cases,
so that they become matters for federal judges who could no
longer be overruled by ordinary lawmakers. Judicialization of
seen to raise a constitutional issue. See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE
MIDDLE CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC
(2017); Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political
Economy: An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic
Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2016) (“For prior generations of reformers
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, economic circumstances
[of extreme inequality] like our own posed not just an economic, social, or political
problem, but a constitutional one . . . . [T]oday [that discourse], with important but
limited exceptions, lies dormant: a discourse of constitutional political economy.”); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1466 (2016) (“Without accounting for the
influence of economic elites over policymaking, leading constitutional theories in
some cases are incomplete, and in other cases, fail to achieve their stated goals.”).
192
For example, the lawyer who argued before the Supreme Court that the
Second Amendment should be incorporated against the states urged the Court to
use the Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than the traditional mechanism
of the Due Process Clause. When Justice Ginsburg asked why he was making
that creative argument, the lawyer responded that reviving the Privileges and
Immunities Clause could (re)constitutionalize economic rights such as the right to
contract and the right to property. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, McDonald
v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
193
A literature has begun the project of evaluating the Constitution, not
merely interpreting it to reach desirable results. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON,
OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW
WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 27–34 (2006) (contending that many of the Constitution’s provisions promote unjust or ineffective government); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 4–26 (2012) (arguing that the Constitution is
most defensible as a source of inspiration rather than a source of law).
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disputes could be reduced, as could federalization of issues
that otherwise might remain questions of state law.
More generally, something like Primus’s vision would become more attainable: lawyers could disagree with each other,
even about the meaning of the Constitution. But they would do
so not, as Primus says, despite the fact that the Constitution
implicates their highest values—requiring them to tolerate conflict exactly where their commitments are strongest. Rather,
they would disagree without necessarily accusing each other of
betraying the nation’s highest principles.
On the other hand, there are good reasons for caution.
Constitutional law remains one of the few remaining foundations of national unity, at a time when virtually all other institutions of government have been wholly or partially
delegitimized through partisan division. It is hard to think of
another national government institution that enjoys the same
kind of support—perhaps American troops fighting on an active battlefield come close, but few other government projects
bring the citizenry together.194 Even the Supreme Court,
viewed as the guardian of constitutional law, has suffered a
diminution of public regard. The Constitution is distinctive as
a subject and stimulant of national unity.
Another worry might be that constitutional law would become less responsive to democratic mobilizations, not more
responsive. We think this concern is probably unfounded—
after all, statutes and common law rules can also be influenced
by social movements and political dynamics.195 Still, we realize
that some of the distinctive interpretive arguments that lawyers
direct toward the Constitution allow its meaning to shift, perhaps also in response to political and institutional dynamics.
Think for instance of the relative unimportance of the text, or
the unique role of structural argumentation. To the degree that
unifying interpretative argumentation reduces democratic responsiveness, legal theorists might have reason to worry.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing that the mythological status of the Constitution is historically and culturally contingent would open up
conceptual space for new forms of normative argument regarding that status. Fully engaging in that debate not only would
194

See Rana, supra note 188, at 340.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479, 1479–87 (1987) (showing that the present societal, political, and
legal context should and does impact the interpretation of statutes).
195
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take us far beyond the subject matter of our original project—
the specialness of constitutional interpretation—but it would
also demand a shift in methodology. We could no longer argue
only empirically and inductively (words that Stack insightfully
uses to describe our method). Instead, or in addition, we would
have to argue from principles of American political morality.
Must the Constitution be regarded as special in order to vindicate commitments to democratic responsiveness, and to full
and equal membership for everyone? That is a question we
would be happy to explore in further work. Our object here has
been to make it available for debate. If a conversation about
these fundamental questions should emerge, we can think of
no better interlocutors than Professors Primus and Stack.

